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THE FREEDOM NOT TO CONTRACT 
WENDELL H. HOLMES* 
The Anglo-American legal tradition has long espoused the 
view that contracts are creations of the exercise of mutual as­
sent. General rules of offer and acceptance require that the par­
ties clearly manifest their intent to be bound. This manifesta­
tion ordinarily takes the form of prom ises, either express or 
implied, by each party to the other. This truism is subject to an 
important, although not necessarily inevitable, qualification: 
that the parties will be required to act in accordance with the 
m anifestations of their intent measured by an objective stan­
dard.1 In the terminology of traditional contract law,2 it is the 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A. 1974, Millsaps Col­
lege; J.D. 1977, Tulane University. 
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONTRACTS §§ 2, 4, 17-24, 26, 35 (1979). This 
discussion presupposes the existence of what has traditionally been called a bilateral 
contract, in which both parties exchange promises. The necessary manifestation of intent 
can, of course, take the form of performance in a unilateral contract. Id. § 18. The Sec­
ond Restatement abandons the bilateral-unilateral dichotomy in nomenclature. 
2. For purposes of this article, the definitions of "classical contract law," "neoclas­
sical contract law" and "traditional contract law" are those suggested by Profesor Ian 
Macneil. By classical contract law Macneil refers to the theoretical structure associated 
with Samuel Williston. This structure is best expressed in Professor Williston's multi­
volume treatise and the Restatement of Contracts (1932), for which he served as re­
porter. Neoclassical contract law describes the significant modifications of that structure 
represented by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts (1979). I would add as an essential precursor to both the treatise of Arthur 
Corbin, whose work heavily influenced both the U.C.C. and Second Restatement. Mac­
neil has used the term traditional contract law to encompass both classical and neoclassi­
cal doctrine. See Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 855 
n.2 (1978). 
This article uses the term traditional contract law because neither classical nor neo­
classical theory differs significantly in its treatment of the issues discussed herein. How­
ever, the following "traits" of classical contract theory should be noted: 
1) an emphasis on contractual liberty manifested in a noninterventionist gov­
ernmental posture a n d  premised on the equality of bargaining power necessary 
to make this freedom meaningful; 2) a tendency toward relativism and subjec­
tivism displaying itself in a general lack of concern with good faith, fair deal­
ing, and substantive justice; 3) a formalism expressing itself in a system of 
autonomous, abstract, precise, general, and mechanical rules; and 4) a wide 
social sweep, created by its tendency to take over areas of life now governed by 
other legal doctrines. Permeating all these traits was classical contract law's 
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reasonable person's interpretation of the promisor's . int�nt that 
is of paramount significance, rather than the pr?m1sor s unex­
pressed, subjective beliefs.3 So long as the p�om1�ee both hon­
estly and reasonably believes that the prom1sor intends to be 
bound, the law deems the requisite assent to be present.• 
From this fundamental proposition, traditional contract la� 
proceeded to a corollary principle: regardless of the form. of h�s 
promise, so long as a party manifests with sufficient clarity. his intention not to be bound, then no legally enforceable obliga­
tions can result.& Thus, what in every other sense would be con­
sidered a binding contract could, by use of appropriate language, 
be transformed into a "gentlemen's agreetnent" evidencing a 
moral obligation, "enforceable" only by the sanction of  honor 
rather than the processes of law.6 According to traditional con­
tract theory, then, the freedom of contract carried with it a cor­
relative freedom not to contract. The logic would seem irrefuta­
ble: if all contracts are promises,7 then those promises that 
main defining feature: its emphasis on freedom. 
Metzger & Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory 
of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 501 (1983). 
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) & comment c (1979) (defining 
promise as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, 
so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made"). 
A classic formulation of the objective theory was given by Judge Learned Hand in 
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911): 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individ­
ual, intent of the parties. . . . If . . . it were proved by twenty bishops that 
either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual 
meaning which the law imposes on them, he would still be held, unless there 
were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort. 
4. The promisee, then, must not only be justified in an objective sense in believing 
that the promisor made an offer; he must also honestly (i.e., subjectively) believe that 
this was the promisor's intent. If either element is lacking, no enforceable offer has been 
made. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954). 
. 
5. This is true both in the United States and in England. See, e.g .. W. ANSON, AN­
SON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 66-67 (A. Guest 25th ed. 1979); CHESHIRE & F1FoOT's LAW OF 
CONTRACT 102-04 (M. Furmston 10th ed. 1981); 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 34 
(1963); J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 20, at 31 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 1 S. WILLISTON, 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1957). 
6. A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 34. 
7: See RESTATEMENT
. 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) ( defining contract as "a 
promise or a set �f promises 
_
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law m some way recognizes as a duty"). In this sense contracts 
may be categori�ed as a subs�t
. 
of all promises, i.e., those promises that are legally en­
forceable. See Lightsey, A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 45 (1984). 
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create contracts can be negated by express declarations that 
they do not bind the promisor. 
The "promise model"8 embraced by traditional contract law 
has had no shortage of critics.9 It is hardly revolutionary to sug­
gest that no unitary law of contract now exists, if indeed it ever 
did. There is, however, no consensus regarding what has supple­
mented, or perhaps supplanted, the regime of consent. The most 
notable and obvious theory is that detrimental reliance may ob­
tain independent standing with intent in the pantheon of  con­
tractual obligations.10 Others have argued that the results of 
modern contract cases may be more accurately described in 
terms of the status of the parties than the requirements of the 
promise model. 11 A strong trend in alternative contract theory 
views the relationships between contracting parties as generating 
their respective rights and obligations.12 Nonetheless, arguably 
8. This article uses the term "promise model" to describe the theoretical construct 
established by the two Restatements for the enforcement of contracts. This construct 
centers upon the traditional rules governing offer, acceptance, and consideration. 
9. By the same token, it is not without its defenders, at least in the sense of those 
who view promise as the primary component of contract. The outstanding example is 
Professor Charles Fried, whose recent book argues that contracts are enforceable because 
promises are morally binding on those who make them. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 
(1981); see also Blum & Wellman, Participation, Assent and Liberty in Contract For­
mation, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901 (arguing that freedom of contract is a liberty protected by 
state and federal constitutions and that mutual assent is the fundamental standard of 
contract obligation); Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980) (arguing that substantial congruence exists between 
traditional contract rules and optional promissory enforcement). 
10. I make no attempt to enumerate exhaustively those who have either suggested 
or espoused the theory that reliance is at least an alternative to promissory obligation; 
for a recent comprehensive survey of this position, see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2. 
The Second Restatement, while grounded in the promise theory, is replete with refer­
ences to the reliance concept. The most obvious of these is section 90 (promissory estop­
pel); other provisions dealing with reliance include sections 34, 87, 89, 139, 349 and 377. 
For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: 
The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981). See also Fuller 
& Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1937) (a 
seminal work widely credited with bringing the question of reliance-based injuries to the 
forefront of the modern law of contract damages, thereby focusing attention on the gen­
eral issue of detrimental reliance). 
11. See, e.g., Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 
(1972); cf. Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 575 
(1943) (discussing the prominence of nonpromissory or "compulsory" obligations in mod­
ern society); Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941 
(1971) (arguing that modern law relates to persons primarily in the context of their social 
roles). 
12. Professor Fried characterizes this theory as follows: 
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the most influential contemporary authority, the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, accepts the promise model and reaffirms 
the freedom not to contract, albeit somewhat diffidently: 
"Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally 
binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a mani­
festation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal rela­
tions may prevent the formation of a contract."13 
On this view, contractual relations establish ties of community between the 
parties, and such ties generate their own moral imperatives, quite apart from 
the limited obligations the parties may have assumed in creating the relation . 
. . . [T)his view does not hold that a set of obligations is imposed on the par­
ties by society for general social purposes; but rather, the relationship itself is 
seen as implying moral duties and constraints. 
C. FRIED. supra note 9, at 76. He includes Professors Macneil, Fuller, Gilmore, Kessler, 
and Atiyah as prominent advocates of this view. Id. Significant works by those authors 
include P AT1vAH. PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW (1981) [hereinafter cited as P. ATIYAH, 
PROMISES]; P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as P. ATIYAH, R1sE AND FALL); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968); G. GILMORE, 
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); I. MACNEIL, THE NEw SocIAL CONTRACT (1980) [herein­
after cited as I. MACNEIL, Soc1AL CONTRACT); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bar­
gaininp in Good Faith and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. 
REv . 401 (1964); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Macneil, Many Futures); cf. S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 32a, at 
89-90 (discussing relational duties existing at common law). 
t:t RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1979) (emphasis added). The com-
ments elaborate on this proposition: 
Parties to what would otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree 
that their legal relations are not to be affected. In the absence of any invali­
dating cause, such a term is respected by the law like any other term, but such 
an agreement may present difficult questions of interpretation: it may mean 
that no bargain has been reached, or that a particular manifestation of inten­
tion is not a promise; it may reserve a power to revoke or terminate a promise 
under certain circumstances but not others. In a written document prepared b y  
one party it may raise a question of misrepresentation o r  mistake or overreach­
ing; to avoid such questions it may be read against the party who prepared it. 
The parties to such an agreement may intend to deny legal effect to their 
subsequent acts. But where a bargain has been fully or partly performed on 
one side, a failure to perform on the other side may result in unjust enrich­
ment, and the term may then be unenforceable as a provision for a penalty or 
forfeiture .... In other cases the term may be unenforceable as against public 
policy because it unreasonably limits recourse to the courts or as unconsciona­
bly limiting the remedies for breach of contract. 
Id. comment b (emphasis added). 
Section 21 was incorporated unchanged (although renumbered) from the original 
draft of the Second Re
.
statement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 218 
(Tent. Draft No. l. April 13, 1964). It had no direct counterpart in the First Restate­
ment, perhap!I an indication that to Professor Williston, the reporter, the concept that 
one ill free to nel{al� contractual obligations by appropriate expressions was so self-evi­
dent that rf'�talml{ 1t wa!I superfluous. Certainly Williston, the paragon contracts cl 
·-
d I . . b"l 
ass1 
ci!lt, h<>ld no 011 1ti; R!I to •ts via 1 ity: "It is indeed true that if the parties to an agree-
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This article seeks to consider the continued viability of this 
freedom not to contract14 through examination of the most com­
mon situations where "no-binding-effect" clauses are utilized: 
employer-employee agreements involving bonuses, pensions, and 
death benefits, 111 and the "letters of intent" or "memoranda of 
understanding" frequently executed in commercial settings.18 An 
analysis of these cases suggests that, contrary to traditional 
dogma, such clauses are not regularly enforced by courts on any 
systematic basis. The article examines the means by which 
courts avoid giving effect to such clauses, and their rea­
sons-either apparent or real-for so doing. The discussion at­
tempts to determine why parties continue to include such 
clauses in their agreements, and whether any useful purpose is 
ment undertake that no legal obligation shall be created, their undertaking in this regard 
will be respected by the law, as would any other term of their agreement, provided 
neither the agreement nor the stipulation itself is illegal." S. WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 
21 , at 39-41. This article will examine the extent of the law's "respect" for such under­
takings, as well as consider how strenuously courts seek the "invalidating causes" re­
ferred to in comment b above. 
The First Restatement did address the issue of statements of intention that do not 
constitute offers, but in a far broader context than that of section 21 of the Second 
Restatement. The language of the First Restatement makes an interesting comparison to 
section 21: 
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the circumstances 
existing at the time, the person to whom the promise or manifestation is ad­
dressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend 
it as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression 
of assent, he has not made an offer. 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1932); see also id. § 20 (neither mental assent to 
promises nor real or apparent intent to be bound is essential). The circumstances that 
may create actual or constructive knowledge of the promisor's intent not to be bound are 
myriad. This article is limited to those situations where an express declaration of pur­
pose has been made. For distinctions of other types of cases, see infra note 17. 
14. In addition to the Second Restatement, two recent and widely-used contracts 
treatises, those of Professor Farnsworth and Professors Calamari and Perillo, accept this 
principle with little or no qualification. According to Farnsworth, under the objective 
theory, a court will honor a party's intention that his promise have no legal consequences 
if the other party knows or has reason to know it. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.7, at 
116 (1982). Thus, he concludes: 
The easiest way for a party to make clear his intention not to be legally bound 
is to say so. In a number of commercial contexts, parties enter into "gentle­
men's agreements" that state that they are not legally binding, and it is be­
yond question that the parties can in this way tum an otherwise enforceable 
agreement into an unenforceable one. 
Id. ·at 117. Professors Calamari and Perillo are essentially in accord. See J. CALAMARI & 
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6-11, at 216 (2d ed. 1977). 
15. See infra notes 18-78 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 79-129 and accompanying text. 
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served by doing so. Since my conclusion suggests that there h�s 
been a deterioration of the promise model of contracts, the arti­
cle will consider whether the outcome of these cases may be 
more accurately explained by alternative theories of contractual 
obligation. The conclusion reformulates the current status of the 
freedom not to contract.11 
17. It shnuld be noted that this article does not purport to be an exhaustive survey 
of cases on point, and attempts no quantificational analysis. The basic methodology em­
ployed is examination of representative cases within each cate�ory �nd of s�bsequent 
cases dealing in some fashion with no-binding-effect clauses which, m many mstances, 
cite one or more of the principal cases as authority. For other collections of some of the 
categories of cases discussed herein, see Note, Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan 
M11dificati11n, 56 CoLuM. L. REV. 251 (1956); Note, Legal Problems of Private P_ension 
Plans, 70 HARV. L. REV. 490 (1957); Note, Consideration for the Employer's Promise of a 
Voluntary Pension Plan, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1955); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3D 464 (1972); 
Annot., 42 A.L.R.2D 461 (1955). 
Certain other issues, related to but outside the purview of this article, should be 
noted at this point. First, this article is not concerned with the enforceability of so-called 
" agreements to agree," i.e., an agreement which the parties intend to express an existing 
obligation hut which leaves one or more terms to be resolved by future negotiation. 
These agreements will often be treated as unenforceable on grounds that a court should 
not contract for the parties or bind them to terms· upon which they were unable to agree. 
SeP, e.N .. Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964) (renewal option in lease providing 
for rental to be agreed upon on the basis of "comparative business conditions" of the two 
lease periods held invalid). Contra Greene v. Leeper, 193 Tenn. 153, 245 S.W.2d 181 
(1%1) ( renewal option in lease leaving rental to be agreed upon according to "business 
('(lnditions" at the time of renewal valid and enforceable; rental value subject to proof by 
expert telltimony). Courts that refuse to enforce such agreements essentially treat the 
failure to al{ree upon the terms left open as evidence of a lack of present assent. J. MUR­
RAY • . �upra note 5, § 27. The Uniform Commercial Code has significantly alleviated such 
prohlemll in cnntracts for the sale of goods. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978); J. WHITE 
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK Of THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-1 to 
:1.9 ( 1972). The Second Restatement applies many of the U.C.C. concepts in this area to 
rnntractll genera lly. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 33-34 (1979). See gen­
t>rally Knapp, f:nforcinN the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1973). 
A Mecond category of cases outside of the parameters of this article is the "formal 
contract contemplated" cases. Typically these cases involve parties who negotiate a 
transaction with the expectation that they will ultimately sign a formal document setting 
forth the llpecitic terms of their agreement. During the process of negotiation, they may 
real'h an oral or written consensus on most, if not all, of the material terms of exchange. 
In most le!(al systems, the parties can stipulate by appropriate language that the contem­
plated writing is constitutive, and that there will be no contract if this writing is not 
roncluded. See l R. ScHLESSJNGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON 
<'oRF. or LE<;AL SvsTEMS 178 (1968). If, however, the parties are unable to agree on a 
formal document and one party sues for breach, a court may be faced with the difficult 
factual ques
.
tion of whether the �arties intended their promises to be legally enforceable 
t�efore .:� �nal docum�nt was s1gne� . See, e.g., Sommer v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 376 F. 
Supp. _9, !S.D.N.Y. 1914). As one might suspect, there is little consistency in the results 
(�f such cases. See A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 30; J. MURRAY, supra note 5, § 21; L. 
SIMPSON, HANDBOOK 01' THE LAW OF CONTRAC TS§ 17 (2d ed. 1965); S. WILLISTON, supra 
1986] FREEDOM NOT TO CONTRACT 
I. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS 
A. Death, Pension and Other Benefits 
757 
The most common cases dealing with no-binding-effect 
clauses in employment relations involve promises by employers 
to pay death benefits, pensions, severance allowances, and simi­
lar benefits. Such inducements indisputably enhance employee 
performance, loyalty, and goodwill. For obvious reasons, how­
ever, employers have long persisted (in the absence of a re­
straining statute)18 in describing these benefits as gratuitous, in-
note 5, § 28; Knapp, supra. 
Clearly, the factual permutations of such cases are limitless; this article includes 
only those unusual cases where the parties have reduced their agreement to a relatively 
complete written form but included a no-binding-effect clause foreshadowing the execu­
tion of a further d ocument. In this instance, Corbin states that notwithstanding the 
agreement on all details, the parties may still maintain "complete immunity" from obli­
gation, according to their stated intentions. A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 30, at 98. This 
article will explore the validity of Professor Corbin's assertion. 
Perhaps the most common means of denying present effect to an agreement is the 
incorporation of express conditions to enforceability. While enforceability may be made 
conditional on the occurrence of an extrinsic event, in commercial transactions a more 
common requirement is that one party fulfill objective criteria to the other party's satis­
faction. Such conditions may give rise to various factual issues, including questions of 
good faith, but ordinarily they do not suggest a lack of intent to contract. Thus, many 
agreements that might include expressions of present unenforceability are excluded from 
the scope of this article because they link enforceability to the existence of express con­
ditions. A common, industry-wide example in this country is loan commitments. See 
Draper, The Broken Commitment: A Modern View of the Mortgage Lender's Remedy, 
59 CORNELL L. REV. 418 (1974); Mehr & Kilgore, Enforcement of the Real Estate Loan 
Commitment: Improvement of the Borrower's Remedies, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1011, 1015-
19 (1978). 
Finally, in many cases in which the parties appear to have entered into a binding 
written contract, one party may challenge the contract on the grounds that both under­
stood that the transaction was a sham. Such cases ordinarily turn on the applicability of 
the parol evidence rule to evidence supporting that contention, rather than questions of 
intent. See, e. g., Kilpatrick Bros. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 464 F.2d 1080 
(10th Cir. 1972); Kind v. Clark, 161 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 808 (1947); 
Arizona Cotton Ginning Co. v. Nichols, 9 Ariz. App. 493, 454 P.2d 163 (1969); McGuire v. 
Luckenbach, 131 Colo. 333, 281 P.2d 997 (1955); Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 48 
N.W.2d 172 (1951); cf. Smith v. MacDonald, 37 Cal. App. 503, 174 P. 80 (1918) (provi­
sion in promissory note that it would be void in the event of transfer or institution of 
legal collection efforts constituted covenant not to sue). 
18. Chief among these, in the area of pensions, is the Employment Retirement In­
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-1461 (1982)). In addition, several states have adopted statutes prohibiting em­
ployers from terminating pension benefits once the plan requirements for vesting have 
been met. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:8-4 (West Supp. 1984). Initially, American courts 
regarded all private pension plans as gratuities that could be withdrawn at any time, 
even in the absence of no-binding-effect clauses. The broadest implications of the "gra-
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tended to create no contract rights, or subject to amendment or 
revocation at any time. Notwithstanding such qualifying lan­
guage, to the extent that an employee performs services after 
such promises, one would suspect that few, if any, cases would so 
severely test the reach of the objective theory. Yet one recent 
treatise states that "[g]enerally, the courts have held that reli­
ance on the terms of the offer creates no liability."19 Certainly, 
employers have been successful in a surprising number of deci­
sions. An analysis of four well-known cases and their progeny 
demonstrates, however, that the assertion that employers can 
generally insulate themselves from liability by the recitation of 
disclaimers is highly questionable. Indeed, each of the four, 
Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co.,20 Schofield v. Zion's Mercantile Insti­
tution,21 Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden,22 and Psutka v. Michi­
gan Alkali Co.,23 decided at the height of traditional contract 
theory,2" held employers liable on promises that were, by any 
objective analysis, clearly illusory and that unequivocably indi­
cated an "intent" not to be bound. 
Tilbert presents the archetypal case. In 1923, the defendant 
issued to its employee a "Certificate of Benefit" providing for 
tuity theory" have been generally discredited, although various grounds for enforcing 
benefit agreements have been asserted, such as promissory estoppel, unilateral contract, 
and deferred wages. See B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS or EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER 
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 4-14 (1961); Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired 
Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 916-21 (1970); Note, A Reappraisal of the Private Pen­
.,wn Sys.tern, 57 CORNELL L. REV . 278, 282-85 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Reappratsal]. 
19. J:. CALAMARI & J. PERl
.
LLO, supra note 14, § 6-11, at 216. The authors acknowl­
e�ge that (b]y the. prcx:ess of interpretation of the terms of the offer so as to preclude withdrawal or . mod1ficat10n after the employee has retired or died, such promises have 
h
.
een on <>cca.�wn enforced." Id. (emphasis added). This article suggests that those occa­
s11ms have arisen a good deal more frequently than this text would suggest. 
20. 116 Conn. 357, 165 A. 205 (1933). 
21. 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934). 
22. 129 Ohio. St. �75, 195 N.E. 697 (1935), noted in Contracts-Offer and Accept­
an�e-Etfec� of D1sc�aimer of Obligation in Promise to Employee 49 Harv. L. Rev. 148 
(19.15) [hereinafter cited as Contracts]. 
23. 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385 (193S). 
24. It also should be noted that these cas . h d . . es arose m t e epths of the Great De-press10n, a time when one should not be ove 1 · d . r Y surprise to find em l k" to rene"e on promises The prot t. . 
P oyers see mg 
" · ec 10n given employees · th 
. 
with other efforts, both legislative and judicial t t 
m 
h
es� cases may be consistent 
durina that period of financ·ial · S 
' 0 pro ect t e rights of the disadvantaged 
,. exigency. ee e g Hom Bid & L ' . 
290 U.S :l98 (1934) (upholdi"ng t"t . ' ·. ·• 
e g. oan Ass n v. Blaisdell, 
· cons 1 ut1onahty of M" ta' 
moratorium law). 
mneso s mortgage foreclosure 
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the payment of a death benefit to the employee's named 
beneficiary. No consideration was recited. The certificate pro­
vided for automatic lapse upon the employee's termination, but 
more importantly included the following disclaimers: 
"This benefit plan being voluntary on the part of Eagle 
Lock Co., it is  understood that it constitutes no contract with 
any Employee or any beneficiary, and confers no legal rights on 
him or  them. It in no way interferes with his freedom to leave 
our employ whenever he pleases, nor on the other hand, does it 
take away our right as Employer to dismiss any Employee." 
"We fully expect and hope this benefit plan as outlined 
above will continue indefinitely and will be appreciated by the 
Employees to the extent that we feel justified in continuing the 
plan indefinitely. We must, however, and do reserve to our­
selves the right to discontinue these benefits at any time with­
out any liability on our part to any employee or any benefi­
ciary, either or both."211 
Thereafter the defendant decided to cancel the certificates 
effective August 28, 1931 (the next payday). This fact was not 
communicated to employees until their paychecks were distrib­
uted that day with a notice of cancellation attached. Unfortu­
nately for the defendant, the plaintiff's husband had died at 2:00 
a.m. on the 28th, several hours before the working day began. 
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut had no diffi­
culty in imposing liability on the defendant. Primarily, the court 
focused upon an ostensible issue of consideration. Declaring that 
the defendant "must be assumed" to have requested the em­
ployee's continued service, the court found a clear acceptance of 
the death benefit offer in the employee's seven years o f  service 
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate. By so doing, he 
"forebore his right to terminate the employment and engage 
elsewhere, and conferred the benefit which the defendant 
sought. "26 
On the crucial question of intent, the court disposed of the 
issue by artful interpretation. In its view, the language quoted 
25. 116 Conn. at  360-61, 165 A. at 207 (quoting "Certificate of Benefit," schedule 
B). The court mentioned but did not discuss the fact that the employer had discontinued 
an existing group life insurance policy concurrently with issuing the certificates. Id. at 
359, 165 A. at 206. 
26. Id. at 362, 165 A. at 207. 
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above involved only the determination whether �ither pa�ty was 
obligated to continue the employment relationship. c.ertamly no 
such obligation existed. To argue, h��ever, t�at this language 
meant that the def end ant had no liability despite acceptance by 
the employee prior to the exercise of the res�rved �ower of.revo­
cation, "would ascribe to the defendant an mtention to �mslead 
its employees, to its advantage, by an inducement which �as 
known and intended by it to be entirely nugatory, and which 
this record does not require [the court] to attribute to it."27 
Thus, the certificate constituted more than an expression of pre­
sent gratuitous intent-it was, instead, a contract.28 
Interestingly, the court did not rely upon vesting, estoppel, 
restitution, contract implied-in-fact, or related concepts in arriv­
ing at this result. Instead its conclusion was based on wholly un­
satisfactory reasoning. Even contemporary commentators recog­
nized that, under the classical analysis, consideration is a 
significant issue only if there is a promise designed to induce a 
reciprocal promise or action. Assuming the fact of promise, it 
takes but little effort for a court to find a reciprocal action.29 
The promise is the fundamental prerequisite, and it exists only 
27. Id. at 362, 165 A. at 207-08. 
28. Somewhat paradoxically, the court concluded that Eagle Lock could discon­
tinue the benefits of their other employees. This is inconsistent with its statement that 
the "consideration" for the contract was the decedent's continued employment after re­
<·eiving the certificate. If the defendant were bargaining for an employee's agreement to 
continue his services, then presumably the "contract" became enforceable at the point 
that the employee manifested assent; thus, any subsequent attempt to  revoke the offer 
would he ineffective under standard contract principles. If the defendant's offer was con­
�trued as seeking service until death as acceptance (i.e., an offer for a unilateral con­
tract), the acceptance would have been effective immediately upon the employee's death. 
In that instance, however, the offer would be revocable for those who had not "ac­
cepted." SeP RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 & comment c (1979). The 
court's dictum on the revocability of the certificates is thus more consistent with the 
the.ory. that the certificates were continuing offers that could be accepted only by dying 
while m the defendant's employ. However, this analysis poses the problems of the revo­
cahility of offers for unilateral contracts once performance has begun. See id. § 4 5; RE­
�TATE�ENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). Nonetheless, the court's opinion can only be read 
as saying that had the employee survived 22 more hours, the plaintiff would have lost. 
The court concluded t�at the entire day in which a contract expires is open to comply 
with 1t; thus, t.he termination did not become effective until the end of the day on Au­
�ust :28, and death at any time on that day would entitle the beneficiary to recovery. 116 
Conn. at :i64, 165 A. at 208. 
29. �ee Grism ore, Con.tracts-Effect of a Stipulation Denying Legal Effect in an 
Employers VCJ/untary Penswn, Bonus or Death Benefit Plan, 34 MICH. L. REV. 7 0 0,  702-
03 ( 1936); 49 HARV. L. REV. 148, 149 (1935). 
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if the intent to be bound is manifested on an objective basis. 
The court in Tilbert ignored this requirement and simply inter­
preted the defendant's intent to be what the court deemed it 
should have been. 30 
The other cases in this group follow similar patterns with 
identical results, although for purportedly different reasons. 
Schofield involved claims for pension benefits under a noncon­
tributory plan. The plaintiffs had performed under this "gratui­
tous" plan and had received retirement payments for several 
years31 before the company revised the plaintiffs' allowances and 
reduced their benefits. The operative language was recited in the 
company's explanatory brochure: 
"15. Neither the action of the Board of Directors in estab­
lishing a System of Pensions, nor any other action now or here­
after taken by them or the Board of Pensions in the inaugura­
tion and operation of a pension department shall be construed 
as giving to any officer or employee of the institution a right to 
be retained in its service, or any right or claim to any pension 
allowance; and the Institution expressly reserves its right and 
privilege to discharge at any time any officer or employee when 
the interest of the Institution in its judgment may so require, 
without liability for any claim for pension or other allowance 
than wages due and upaid." 
"16. The Board of Directors reserves the right to change or 
amend any of the foregoing rules and regulations at any time, 
and to change the basis of pension allowances by increasing or 
reducing the same, whenever, in its judgment, the welfare of 
the Institution may require such change; and the decision of 
said Board of Directors, in establishing such new basis shall be 
absolutely conclusive."Sll 
Focusing upon the substantive provisions of the pension 
plan, the Supreme Court of Utah found them to encompass all 
elements of valid offer-not one inviting a verbal acceptance, 
30. In Professor Atiyah's words, the court indulged in the time-honored device of 
surmising that "the parties 'could hardly have intended' that they should not be bound 
once such-and-such has been done." P. ATIYAH, Riss AND FALL, supra note 12, at 758. 
31. It is noteworthy that the payments apparently came from the company's pay­
roll account. No pension trust or annuity arrangement existed. 85 Utah at 285, 39 P.2d 
at 346. This factor distinguishes certain earlier cases in which employees were unsuccess­
ful. See infra note 35.  
32. 85 Utah at 284, 39 P.2d at 343 (quoting resolution establishing pension system). 
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but one seeking a completed act. Once that act (twenty years o
f 
service and attainment of age sixty-five) had been performed, 
the "contract" was completed and could not be modified at the 
will of the company.ss In essence, t hen, a unilateral contract had 
been formed. 
The court construed the quoted language to give the em­
ployer discretion only toward present employees. Citing the gen­
eral principles of construction that attempt to enforce the pur­
pose of the agreement and favor interpretations that yield valid 
contracts,34 the court determined that the no-binding-effect 
clause was inapplicable to a retired employee whose pension 
rights were "fixed and determined."311 
Mabley, the third case in the sequence, involved the claim 
of the named beneficiary of Anna Work, a deceased employee of 
Mahley and Carew Company, for payments under a death bene­
fit certificate. That certificate contained the following language: 
"The issue and delivery of this certificate is understood to be 
purely voluntary and gratuitous on the part of this Company 
and is accepted with the express understanding that it carries 
no legal obligation whatsoever or assurance or promise of fu­
ture employment, and may be withdrawn or discontinued at 
any time by this Company."se 
In affirming a judgment for the beneficiary, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio sidestepped the question of intent. Rather, the 
"one question" was "the consideration for the issuance of this 
certificate. "31 Since payment would not be made unless the 
33. Id. at 287-88, 39 P.2d at 344-45. 
34. Id. at 288, 39 P.2d at 345. 
35. Id .. �t 293, 3� P.2d at 347. The court implicitly employed a vesting theory as 
well u trad1t1on1l notions of unilateral contracts . 
. l_
n reaching thia reaolution, the court was forced to distinguish a number of other 
deciawna whe�e. for vari�ua reaaons, employees had fared less well. In general those cases 
fall into two hn
_
n. each inte�eating because the themes involved are common where em­
ployee• have failed. In one hne, the �mployees failed to satisfy stated eligibility require­�enta. In the other, the e��loyeea' rights were limited to claims against employer-estab­
hah� ��110n funda admm1atered by third parties. The employees' status as third-party benetic11nes apparently .prejudi�ed their claims; the failure or discontinuance of the fund created no cause of a�t10� against the employer. The lack of employer control of the fund appeared determinative. Id. at 289, 39 P.2d at 345-46. Similar cases are d" d in{ra notes 58-59. iscusse 
36. 129 Ohio St. at 377-78, 195 N.E. at 698 (quoting death benefit certificate). 37. Id. at 378, 195 N.E. at 698. 
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decedent died while in the company's employ, the court rea­
soned that the certificate was an inducement to the employee to 
continue working.38 Thus, although Anna Work had n o  enforcea­
ble right during her life, by working until her death she created 
a binding obligation in favor of her beneficiary. 
The court needed no heroic feats of interpretation to elimi­
nate the n o-binding-effect clause. It stated instead only that the 
language "was a part of the contract so far as Anna Work was 
concerned. She had no right that she could possibly assert, as 
she had to die before the right would ripen in any one. "39 The 
court apparently viewed the clause as null against the benefi­
ciary, however. "0 The decision concluded with the proposition 
that contracts should be upheld and the rights of the parties 
preserved "if the same can be done without doing violence to 
language. We find no trouble in upholding this contract. "41 
Psutka, the last of the four, adds a somewhat different 
gloss. The payments at issue were part of a comprehensive non­
contributory " pension and death benefit plan" promulgated by 
the employer that included the following rules applicable to 
both types of benefits: 
"24. This pension plan is a purely voluntary provision for 
the benefit of employees superannuated or totally incapaci­
tated after long and faithful service, and constitutes no con­
tract and confers no legal rights upon any employee." 
"25. Neither the creation of this plan nor any other action 
at any time taken by the committee shall give to any employee 
a right to be retained in the service, and all employees remain 
38. Id. at 379, 195 N.E. at 698. Indeed, ignoring well-established principles of "past 
consideration," the court even offered that the employer's expression of appreciation for 
the "duration and faithful character" of Anna Work's services established a further 
consideration. 
39. Id., 195 N.E. at 698. 
40. See Id. at 380, 195 N.E. at 699 (neither the fact that Anna Work had no obliga­
tion to continue her services, nor Mahley & Carew to employ her, "in any wise affected 
the right of the beneficiary"). 
41 .  Id., 195 N.E. at 699. A contemporary writer criticized the court's reasoning as 
"incompatible with orthodox contract theory," because the disclaimer was 80 explicit 
that it negated the possibility that the certificate was an offer. The writer endorsed the 
result, however, noting the probability of detrimental reliance by the employee, and cit­
ing § 90 of the then recently promulgated Restatement of Contracts. The writer con­
cluded that the case demonstrated "a tendency to avoid unconscionable results by the 
application of more flexible principles." 49 HARV. L. REV. 148, 149 (1935). 
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subject to discharge to the same extent as if the pension plan 
had never been created."42 
Unlike the courts in Tilbert, Schofield and Mabley, the Su­
preme Court of Michigan felt constrained to face this problem­
atic language more directly. With only a passing reference to 
consideration,48 a divided court took up the question of intent. 
To the majority, the plan consisted of two separate parts: the 
"positive" promises to pay benefits, and the provisions of rule 
24, denying legal effect to the positive promises. If rule 24 were 
to negate the contractual nature of the plan, then "under the 
rule that the first of the conflicting clauses in the instrument 
shall be received and the latter rejected . . .  rule 24 must fall.""' 
Unwilling to completely eliminate the offending provision, how­
ever, the court compromised by "reading the document as a 
whole" and "resolving ambiguities against defendant." So 
viewed, the "reasonable interpretation "  was that "the quoted 
sections were intended to exclude claims of inchoate rights 
under the plan, not to mulct the employees or their dependents 
of accrued death benefits. "411 
The dissent offered a classical analysis, giving primacy to 
the written expression of intent. From this perspective, it was 
clear that " [t)here was no intent upon the part of the employers 
to enter into a binding legal obligation."46 The employee's con­
tinuation of services "was a recognition that the plan did not 
constitute a contract nor confer any legal rights upon him. "47 
The result should thus have been simple: 
It is a general rule that if the parties to an agreement stipulate 
that their writing, which in all respects appears to be a con­
tract, is not to be a contract, the courts will not enforce it; or if 
the writing contains stipulations against legal effect, courts will 
refuse to enforce such writings as contracts.•• 
42. 274 Mic
.
h.  
_
at 32�. _264 N.W. at 387 (quoting pension and death benefit plan). 43. The ma1or1ty opinion stated only that "ample consideration" existed in the "at­
traction of more competent workmen to defendant's employ, the inducement of better 
and more continuous M!rvice, and the avoidance of expense of labor turnover." Id. at 319, 
264 N.W. at 386. 
44. Id. at 320, 2S. N .W. at 386. 
45. Id., 264 N . W .  at 386 (emphasis in original). 
46. Id. at 324, 264 N.W. at 388. 
4i. Id , 264 N.W. at 388. 
48. Id. at 324, 264 N.W.  at 388 (emphaeia added) The di••ant·an · · f . · .,.,... g opm1on, o 
cnul'M', fllil!I to addrt>u an ohv10U11 factual diBCrepancy between Psutka and the case it 
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To the dissent, then, the defendant's position was correct: the 
plan was merely benevolent, and the employer's largesse could 
be dispensed or withheld, according to its individual determina­
tion in each case. 
Theoretical considerations aside, it is clear that in an era 
predating Social Security benefits and statutory protections of 
vested pension rights, the case-by-case approach suggested by 
the dissenting justices in Psutka was unworkable. One would not 
expect courts so to expose employees to the whims of their em­
ployers. •9 Indeed, it would be naive to suggest that the results of 
these cases were in any way unpredictable or extraordinary, ei­
ther from an historical or doctrinal standpoint. 110 What is note-
posits: i.e., the only writing in Psutka is not "theirs," but that of one party only, offered 
without any mutual negotiation of terms. 
49. On the other hand, Professor Grismore criticized Psutka on this very basis. In 
his view, decisions imposing liability on employers who promulgated voluntary plans 
acted as a disincentive to their adoption at all. Since he believed that employers would 
not repudiate such plans absent "compelling financial reasons," he favored reliance upon 
"moral rather than legal pressure" to ensure their performance until such protections 
became compulsory. Grismore, supra note 29, at 705. 
50. While these decisions may have represented questions of first impression in 
their respective jurisdictions, there was significant authority to the contrary. Possibly the 
best-known case preceding these was Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 
115 So. 94 (1927). There, the employer delivered to the decedent a certificate of group 
life insurance, accompanied by a form letter provided by the insurance company. While 
the letter offered assurances to the decedent that the certificate would remain in force 
"as long as you continue as an employee, without payment on your part or deduction 
from your salary," it added: "We trust you will accept this certificate in the spirit in 
which it is given - a genuine expression of good will on our part for your loyal coopera­
tion and service." Id. at 156, 115 So. at 96 (emphasis in original). The employer allowed 
the certificate (as well as additional insurance purchased by the decedent for which de­
ductions were made) to lapse. This was not discovered by the plaintiff until the dece­
dent's death. 
The court held for the employer. It saw the group policy as "a voluntary and gratui­
tous act." Moreover, the employer's agreement to make payments on the additional in­
surance through payroll deductions was but "a gratuitous agency." The court treated 
this as a question of consideration. Finding nothing given by the decedent in exchange 
for the promise, the court concluded that no contract existed. Id., 115 So. at 98. 
Meyerson did not involve a no-binding-effect clause as such. The quoted language 
apparently served only to bolster the court's impression that the employer was acting 
gratuitously. Even considering that in 1927 promissory estoppel had not yet been ex­
tended generally to business and commercial contracts, the decision is puzzling. As Pro­
fessor Grismore noted in 1936, contemporary courts customarily sought-and 
found-consideration in the continuation of services. The element of bargain would be 
inferred from the employer's words: See Grismore, supra note 29, at 702-03. Meyerson's 
strict constructionism and lack of concern for obvious equities may be merely a reflection 
of an era notoriously sympathetic to business interests. See also Dolge v. Dolge, 70 A.D. 
517, 75 N.Y.S. 386 (1902) (upholding "gratuity" clauses of insurance, endowment, and 
766 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 60 
worthy is that these decisions consistently de-emp�asi�e the 
consensual elements of contract liability. An exammat10n of 
later cases that deal with similar claims strongly reinforces this 
perception. 
A useful sampling can be drawn from Connecticut, where, 
after Tilbert, a well-defined line of cases developed dealing with 
employee benefits. Such promises have been treated generally as 
giving rise to binding obligations, despite attempts by employers 
to make their performance discretionary. Although these cases 
deal with varying benefits and factual circumstances, the results 
uniformly suggest the ongoing erosion of the pillar of intent.�1 
Only in those cases where the employee's claim had an indepen­
dent defect, such as failure to comply with stated qualifica­
tions,r.1 lack of definiteness,68 or the lack of an enforceable 
pension benefit accounts to deny claims of employees of dissolving partnership that 
claims against the accounts were entitled to priority as wage claims). 
51.  See Ellis v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 150 Conn. 501, 191 A.2d 546 (1963) (stock option 
plan was valid contract where employees had to continue employment in order to earn 
option; employer's attempt to reserve absolute discretion to determine number of shares 
to which employee was entitled violated public policy against person serving as judge in 
his own case); Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312 (1958) (attempt to impose 
succeuion tax on death benefits contested on grounds that decedent employee did not 
own accrued benefit; tax levy upheld on grounds that plan amounted to contract that 
could be extinguished by condition subsequent: the exercise of employer's power of dis­
continuance, if and to the extent such power existed) .  Cases from other jurisdicitons 
citing Tilbert and conaiatent with it include Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 ( 1st 
Cir. 1978) (rights to noncontributory pension plan benefits vested once payments began; 
right to "change, suspend or discontinue" plan inoperative to cut off vested rights); 
Novack v. Bilnor Corp., 26 A.D.2d 572, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1 17 (1966) (despite language that 
act was "voluntary" and created no contractual obligation, board's resolution to pay bo­
nus if employee remained with company constituted unilateral contract, giving rise to 
deht that could be attached by judgment creditor) .  See generally Pineman v. Oechslin, 
494 F. Supp. 525 (D. Conn.), vacated, 637 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1980) (summarizing Con­
necticut law on vesting of pension rights). 
52. See Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 133 A.2d 894 ( 1957) (em­
ployee's claim for pension denied because resignation after disclosure of malfeasance was 
deemed voluntary; in dicta, however, the court stated that even where employer reserves 
abeolute discretion over plan, court will interpret plan as a whole to effect general pur­
po&e or securing employee loyalty and service; employer cannot defeat employees' rea­
aonahle expectations of the promi&ed reward). 
53. See Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 150 A.2d 607 (1958), 
involving claims for payment of year-end bonuses. The plaintiffs based their claims on 
( 1) the company's put practice of paying bonuses; (2) a company brochure stating that 
1t wu "customary .. for the company to pay bonuses, subject to the availability of earn­
'"" and the discretion of the board; and (3) a reference on a pay slip to voluntary em­
ploypr rontributiona for pensions. vacations, holidays, insurance, and bonuses. The court 
deni.d rP<'nvery, holdin11 that there wa� no offer and, thus, no contract. The total lack of 
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promise,54 were employers successful in avoiding liability. 
Moreover, cases relying upon Schofield, Mabley and Psutka 
follow similar patterns. Although courts cite various theories of 
liability, such as vested rights, 55 unilateral contract, 56 and reli­
ance, 57 the d ecisions almost invariablyas indicate a willingness to 
certainty regarding the bonus amount was more significant than the employer's language, 
however. Past payments had varied greatly. Tilbert and Mabley, both cited by the court, 
involved payments of a sum certain, or an amount calculable from a sum certain. Faced 
with a nebulous claim based merely on the fact of prior payments, the court was disin­
clined to relax its demand for definiteness or to search for the existence of a promise. 
Lack of definiteness presents an inherent impediment to recovery in bonus cases. See 
infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
54. See Corriveau v. Jenkins Bros., 144 Conn. 383, 132 A.2d 67 ( 1957) (employees' 
claim for bonus based on contract implied-in-fact failed; mere fact that bonuses had 
been previously paid gave rise to no present rights). 
55. See, e.g. , Siegel v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 201 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Pa. 
1961) (noncontributory pension was a vested right, not a gratuity; case remanded to re­
solve issue of employee's alleged violation of plan provisions); Luli v. Sun Prod. Corp., 60 
Ohio St. 2d 1 44, 398 N.E.2d 553 (1979); Cantor v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 1 7 1  Ohio St. 
405, 1 7 1  N.E.2d 5 1 8  (1960); cf. Neutfer v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l Union 
of Am., 307 F.2d 67 1 ,  673-76 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J., dissenting) (severance of union 
member's benefits u pheld where, pursuant to contract, union had convicted him of acts 
against the union; then-Judge Burger argued that benefit had become vested and irrevo­
cable despite discretionary language). 
56. See, e.g., Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 
(1955) (severance benefits; alternative theory of promissory estoppel); Cain v. Allen Elec. 
& Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956) (severance pay); Anthony v. Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 ( 1958) (severance pay); 
Dangott v. ASG Indus., 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976) (severance pay); Moore v. Postal Tele­
graph-Cable Co., 202 S.C. 225, 24 S.E.2d 36 1 (1943) (implied duty of good faith); cf. Ellis 
v. Victor Elec. Prods., 85 Ohio App. 170, 88 N.E.2d 275 (1949) (employee bonus claim; 
enforceable contract for bonus created where plaintiff accepted pay cut in transfer after 
being assured that bonus would be "substantially more" than amount of decrease in 
salary) .  
57. See Weesner v. Electric Power Bd. ,  48 Tenn. App. 178, 344 S.W.2d 766 ( 1961) 
(vested rights theory also discussed); see also Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 
Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955) (alternative grounds on retrial). 
58. A well-known case distinguishing Tilbert and Psutka is Hughes v. Encyclope­
dia Britannica, 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 1 1 7  N.E.2d 880 (1954). There, a class of defendant's 
employees sought to enforce the defendant's promise to purchase retirement annuities. 
The defendant reserved the right to " 'change, amend or discontinue the Plan should 
future conditions in the judgment of the Company warrant such action;' " the plan addi­
tionally provided that it was " 'entirely voluntary on the part of the Company and . . . 
shall not be construed as creating a contractual relationship between the Company and 
an eligible employee.' " Id. at 518, 1 17 N.E.2d at 881. The court denied recovery on both 
unilateral contract and promissory estoppel theories. The court found n o  contract be­
cause the language of the plan demonstrated that it was voluntary, and expressly denied 
contractual effect. The estoppel argument was rejected on the grounds that there had 
been no detrimental change in position, since the plaintiffs had already retired . The 
court distinguished Psutka and Tilbert as decisions involving death benefits designed "to 
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ignore written expressions of intent not to �e bound where nec­
essary to avoid a forfeiture of benefits promised before �erform­
ance if the benefits are calculable by a reasonably defimte stan­
dard
'
. G9 Implicit in these results is the judicial belief that the 
avoid the otherwise harsh result of depriving an employee's beneficiary of accrued death 
benefits." Id. at 519, 1 17 N.E.2d at 882. 
Other facts also influenced the court's opinion. First, the employees never had any 
direct rights against the company for payment. The company's contract with Equitable 
Life Assurance specified that the benefits would accrue solely to the employees. The 
plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries with enforceable rights only against Equitable. 
The court distinguished this situation from cases where the employees' rights were 
against the employer directly. See supra note 35; see also cases cited infra note 59. Sec­
ond, all monies paid by the company to purchase annuities remained in the fund, so that 
the company did not profit by discontinuing the plan. Finally, none of the plaintiffs were 
receiving benefits when they sued, since each had already retired. In this context, the 
"sence of reliance appears pivotal, although other courts have readily accepted contin­
employment as the requisite act of detrimental reliance. 
Failure to establish reliance was also determinative in Armstrong Cork Co. v. Boone, 
3o. 2d 863 (Miss. 1966), a case distinguishing Mabley. While the case was decided on 
" technical basis of the statute of limitations, the court noted that the promise made 
.Jf ter injury to pay disability benefits lacked any element of inducement and was there­
fore a gratuity, as indicated by language allowing the company to determine the amount 
of payments. 
Two cases citing Schofield that denied employee claims, Genevese v. Martin-Mari­
etta Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1969), and In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 49 F. Supp. 
405 (E.D. Mo. 1943), are distinguishable since each involved the employer's discretion to 
determine compliance with plan requirements rather than the exercise of no-binding­
effect clauses. 
Perhaps the clearest outright rejection of the reasoning of the principal cases is 
found in Umshler v. Umshler, 332 Ill. App. 494, 76 N.E.2d 231 (1947). Although acknowl­
edging the existence of contrary authority, the court adhered to the gratuity theory of 
pensions and upheld the no-binding-effect language. Again, however, Umshler presented 
a claim with entirely different equities. The case was a suit for separate maintenance 
filed by the deserted spouse of the employee in an attempt to obtain payments allegedly 
due her husband under the plan. Lack of direct inducement or reliance on her part may 
have influenced the denial of her claim. Perhaps most significant, however, was that the 
application signed by her husband recited that any allowance was " 'a gratuity which 
may be discontinued at the pleasure of the company.' " Id. at 498, 76 N.E.2d at 233. 
This acknowledgement introduced an element of apparent mutual assent ordinarily lack­
ing in <lea.th be�efit a�d .pen�ion c�es. Cf. discussion infra note 7 1  and accompanying text (dealing with a s1m1la� issue m a bonus case). Umshler is commonly cited as an 
example ?f the generally disavowed gratuity theory of private pensions. See, e.g., Note, Reappraisal, supra note 18, at 282 n.22. 
5�. As previously no�, this article does not attempt an exhaustive survey of cases on pomt. Its methodology 1s to examine certain paradigmatic cases and to trace the de­velopment of their fundamental holdings through subsequent cases with similar issues. Only in thi� sense is _a systematic analysis attempted. Nonetheless, the weight of cases supports this con�lusion. Those cases that do not are generally factually distinguishable, 
�!though unquestionably some courts have shown greater allegiance to the conce t of intent than others. P 
Other cases outside of the Tilbert-Psutka line should be noted. Among well-known 
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written no-binding-effect clauses did not coincide with the ac-
cases recognizing the contractual nature of private pension plans is Hurd v. Illinois Bell 
Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956); however, Hurd upheld the employer's right to 
determine within stated guidelines the manner in which pensions would be computed. 
Cases in which employees have been unsuccessful include Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 
450 F.2d 1 18 (4th Cir. 1971) (clause in pension agreement divesting pension in event of 
competition by recipient not violative of public policy); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 
786 (8th Cir. 1944) (applied gratuity theory of pensions and upheld employer's discretion 
to determine compliance with conditions of plan in absence of fraud or bad faith); Gron­
lund v. Church & Dwight Co., 514 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (employer's decision 
not to pay bonus that employee admitted was d iscretionary was binding unless unreason­
able, arbitrary, unfair or capricious, although employee's right to receive severance pay 
upheld); Crawford v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Ill. App. 2d 388, 181 N.E.2d 369 ( 1962) (dis­
abled employee promised pension after he sustained injury provided he not work for 
another coal company; court held that because he was incapable of working there was no 
consideration for promise). Clearly, then, employees (or those claiming through them) 
have fared less well if (1)  the issue is compliance with stated prerequisites, rather than 
changes in the plan itself, or (2) the claimant is one other than the employee or his 
successor in interest after death. This is not an absolute proposition in either instance, 
however. See supra note 58. 
It must be acknowledged that intent still occasionally reigns supreme. See, e.g., 
Boese v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3rd Cir. 1970), applying New York law. 
Noting that it appeared unclear whether there was binding state court precedent, the 
court nevertheless held that the employer could, by the use of "clear and unambiguous" 
language, reserve and exercise the right to terminate a pension plan, even where this 
deprived retired employees of earned rights. The employer had apparently explicitly dis­
closed the uncertain nature of the plan to its employees; at least two of the plaintiffs 
admitted at trial that they had been aware of the termination provision. The court also 
found no countervailing public policy considerations. 
Boase was strongly criticized in Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 
1978), where it was characterized as an example of the "discredited 'gratuity' theory of 
pensions." Id. at 6 .  Indeed, intent aside, the Hoefel court held that public policy dictated 
that pension plans be construed to avoid the forfeiture of vested rights. Although Boase 
seems an anachronism, it is possible that the gratuity theory still applies in New York. 
See Note, Reappraisal, supra note 18, at 282 n.22. 
A more recent example, Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 
N.W.2d 222 ( 1977) ,  rev'd per curiam, 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 ( 1978), involved a 
claim for a "separation allowance." After working for defendant for seventeen years, the 
plaintiff was granted a six month educational leave in 1972; there was n o  guarantee of 
employment upon his return, and when the leave expired, no position was available. 
Thus, he was "separated" from the company. The plaintiff based his claim on a provision 
in his employment handbook that "(a] Separation Allowance Plan has been established 
for the benefit of salaried employees laid off or separated from the payroll under certain 
circumstances." Id. at 95, 261 N.W.2d at 223. The handbook continued, however, that it 
"is not intended nor is it interpreted to establish a contractual relationship with the 
employe [sic]." Id., 261 N.W.2d at 223. Moreover, the last page of the handbook included 
the following italicized disclaimer: 
"The contents of this handbook are presented as a matter of information only. 
While General Motors believes wholeheartedly in the plans, policies and proce­
dures described here, they are not conditions of employment. General Motors 
reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend, terminate, or change any or all 
such plans, policies, or procedures, in whole or in part, at any time, with or 
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tual intent of the parties. 
This discussion might suggest that employees who can es­
tablish reliance on a specific promise of a benefit can presump­
tively overcome a no-binding-effect clause.  That this analysis is 
over-simplistic is demonstrated by cases involving performance 
bonuses, which pose superficially similar issues but frequently 
reach opposite results.80 
B. Employee Bonuses 
One of the modern authorities most frequently cited81 in 
support of the freedom not to contract is Spooner v. Reserve 
Life Insurance Co.82 The plaintiffs were agents of the defendant 
insurance company. The defendant issued a bulletin to staff 
members entitled "Extra Earnings Agreement," reporting the 
phenomenal growth of the company. I n  addition to language 
cheering, challenging, and exhorting its agents, the bulletin 
stated that each agent "will receive" a bonus based upon his 
lapse ratio.63 More important, however, was the presence of the 
without notice. The language used in this handbook is not intended to create, 
nor is it to be construed to constitute, a contract between General Motors and 
any one or all of its employees." 
Id., 261 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting employment handbook). While acknowledging that com­
munications to employees may constitute an offer to contract, the court found the above 
disclaimers too explicit to constitute an offer. In addition, the court found that the man­
ner of communication precluded the possibility of detrimental reliance. In the court's 
words, "(i]t is difficult to imagine what defendant could have done, short of not mention­
ing the plan, to prevent the reading of its statement as an offer." Id. at 98, 261 N.W.2d 
at 224. Thus, summary judgment for General Motors was upheld. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Kari indicates that the freedom not to contract is 
not wholly moribund in employment cases. The plaintiff's claim, however, was somewhat 
less than compelling. Not only was his initial "severance" voluntary, it was initiated at 
his request. Moreover, he apparently knew that he might forfeit his job. In light of this, 
the court was not disposed to find that his continuing employment after promulgation of 
the plan constituted consideration for a contract; in the court's view, "further negotia­
tions" were necessary. It is questionable whether the court would have reached the same 
result if the plaintiff had presented a more sympathetic claim, such as an involuntary 
separation. In any event, the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court of 
Appeal, and remanded for retrial on the issue of promissory estoppel.  Kari v. General 
Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978). 
60. See 1upra notes 53-54. 
61 .  E.g., Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 98, 261 N.W.2d 222, 224 
( 1977), rl'v'd per curiam, 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 ( 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OP \.ONTRACT!l § 2 1 ,  reporter's note to comment b ( 1979); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra 
note 1 4 ,  § 6- 1 1 , at 216 n.98. 
62. 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955). 
6:l. Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 736. Bonu11es would increase in inverse proportion to the 
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following disclaimer: 
"This renewal bonus is a voluntary contribution on the 
part of the Company. It is agreed by you and by us that it may 
be withheld, increased, decreased or discontinued, individually 
or collectively, with or without notice. Further, this Renewal 
Bonus is contigent upon you actually writing business for this 
Company as a licensed agent at the time such Bonus is paid."84 
771 
The bulletin was to be signed by each agent and returned to the 
home office. 
The plaintiffs, who had maintained appropriate lapse ratios, 
sued when the bonuses described in the bulletin were not paid. 
Reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that the above paragraph rendered the promise 
illusory and unenforceable. It also refused to apply promissory 
estoppel. While acknowledging that detrimental reliance may 
sometimes make the gratuitous promises of employers enforcea­
ble, the court could find no promise, gratuitous or otherwise, in 
the express language of the bulletin. 
The plaintiffs sought to rely upon Tilbert, Mahley, and 
Psutka to overcome the disclaimer clause.85 The court, however, 
saw the death benefit cases as fundamentally different. In those 
cases, 
in order to avoid seemingly harsh results and to shape the end 
result a little nearer to the courts' desire, plain language . . .  
was ignored or so interpreted as to import enforceable 
promises. No case has been cited to us, nor have we discovered 
any, in which the right to a bonus has been upheld in a situa­
tion in which the employer reserved the right to withhold it.88 
ratio of lapse of existing policies, according to a specific schedule. 
64. Id. , 287 P.2d at 737 (quoting "Extra Earnings Agreement" bulletin )  (emphasis 
in original). 
65. In addition to the cases, the court mentioned Schofield as possible support for 
the plaintiffs' position. Id. at 460, 287 P.2d at 739. 
66. Id. , 287 P.2d at 739. This statement is puzzling in light of the immediately 
preceding citation of George A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, 15 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1926), and 
Wellington v. Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S.W. 396 (1925). In 
Fuller, the plaintiff was given a written promise of a bonus upon his compliance with 
certain conditions; the employer reserved the power to be the "sole judge as to what 
bonus, if any, should be paid." The court held that the plaintiff relied upon a definite 
promise, thus creating a contract. The court construed the language used by the defend­
ant as limited to the determination of compliance with the stated conditions and the 
amount of bonus. 
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The crucial distinction seemed to be that the death benefit cases 
were brought by named third-party beneficiaries, whereas 
Spooner was prosecuted by the employees themselves. In the 
court's view, although Reserve Life's acts were "perilously near 
the perpetration of a fraud,"67 the difference in the standing of 
the plaintiffs justified the court's refusal to "disregard or sup­
press" the terms of the agreement.68 
Spooner is, in many ways, an extraordinary case, both in 
terms of the precedents the court chose not to follow and the 
inherent equities it elected to ignore. To differentiate it from the 
death benefit cases because of those cases' supposedly more 
compelling reliance may have some superficial logic, but the dis­
tinction does not withstand analysis. In another sense, the reli­
ance of the claimants in Spooner is much more immediate than 
that of plaintiffs in the death benefit cases. The Spooner plain­
tiffs sought to enforce compensation promised them for their 
own labors, while the death-benefit beneficiaries had not person­
ally relied on the employers' promises, at least in any identifi­
able sense. Any " detriment" incurred or reliance manifested was 
that of their predecessors. Thus, the plaintiffs' claims in 
Spooner would seem, at least, equally forceful. 
Further, the Spooner court gave no credence to explicit lan­
guage in the "bulletin" that not only permitted, but actively en­
couraged, reliance. The employees were told that the defendant 
wanted them to "enjoy a sense of real security and see the road 
of the future stretching clearly ahead"; to "earn more money 
than [the employees] could anywhere else"; to be "career 
men-men who are as much concerned about next year as next 
month"; to be "very handsomely rewarded" for an "outstanding 
The plaintiff in Wellington based his claim on a profit-sharing plan that the 
defendant developed and described in detail in a personal writing to the plaintiff. The 
plan was characterized as voluntary, and annually renewable. The court held that the �laintiff's performance created a unilateral contract, so that any lack of "mutuality" was �rrelevant. �nd.erlying this result was unquestionably a healthy dose of judicial animos­
ity: The plamt1ff had become a union organizer at some time after the delivery of the written �greement, and the defendant's refusal to pay was clearly punitive. 
While .the "no contract" language employed in Fuller and Wellington is less specific 
than that m Spooner, the Spooner court's assertion that no similar bonus cases existed 
seems unjustified, apart from its artificial reliance on the use of the word "withhold." 
67. 47 Wash. 2d at 459, 287 P.2d at 738. 
68. Id., 287 P.2d at 738. 
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job. "89 The whole communication was designed as an 
inducement, and the subordinate nature of the reservation of 
discretion s uggested at most that it would be used in good faith 
only in extreme instances. In light of the bulletin's express invi­
tation to rely upon the company's promises, the court's decision 
is particularly difficult to accept. 
The opinion barely alluded to the apparent factual basis of 
the decision: the court's belief that the plaintiffs were aware of 
the disclaiming language. Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs were 
required to sign the "bulletin" and return it to the company 
may have been pivotal. Even the language of the dis­
claimer-" [ i  ]t is agreed by you and by us"-couched the plan as 
a mutually negotiated agreement. 70 However disingenuous the 
court's acceptance of this tactic may have been, it distinguishes 
the death benefit and pension cases, in which the rights to alter 
the employer's obligations were imposed unilaterally. Similarly, 
Tilbert, Schofield, Mabley, Psutka, and their progeny lack the 
element of written acceptance found in Spooner.11 
As previously noted, the Spooner result was a departure 
from many prior employment cases.72 Subsequent cases citing 
69. Id. at 455, 287 P.2d at 736 (emphasis in original). The defendant further stated 
that by this plan, "the boys are separated from the men. The boys will get no bonus. 
That Leaves More For The Men." Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 737 (emphasis in original). 
Presumably the defendant intended this to apply with equal force to its female agents, 
since one of the named plaintiffs appears to have been a woman. 
70. Id. at 456, 287 P.2d at 737 (emphasis in original). 
71. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45, comment b ( 1979) (using 
Spooner as an example of unjustified reliance due to language of "offer"). As previously 
noted, one pension case, Umshler, involved a similar written acc eptanc e, and the claim­
ant likewise was unsucc essful. See supra discussion at note 58. 
Interestingly, vesting, another theory succ essful in many death benefit cases, was 
raised by the plaintiffs to no avail. The court briefly discussed whether the term "with­
hold" in the disclaimer could refer only to future payments, but concluded that it was to 
be given its ordinary meaning, "to refrain from paying that which is due." Spooner, 47 
Wash. 2d at 459, 287 P.2d at 738. 
72. See George A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, jl5 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1926); W ellington v. 
Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S.W. 396 (1925). Wellington is fre­
qu ently cited as authority for the proposition that continued employment constitutes 
consideration for the promise of a benefit or bonus. See Lampley v. C elebr ity Homes, 
Inc., 42 Colo. App. 359, 594 P.2d 605 (1979); Nilsson v. Cherokee Candy & Tobacco Co., 
639 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see a lso Geiwitz v. Ge iwitz, 473 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1971 )  (holding that railroad pension was contract subject to garnishment by 
divorced wife). But see Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1965) (employees had no cause of action for noncontributory pension where they 
had no notice before revocation that pension trust had been established); Croskey v. 
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Spooner have often reached res�lts adver�e to employ�e int�r­
ests. Yet almost without exception,73 despite language m opm­
ions emphasizing no-binding-effect clauses, other .factors appear 
to determine the outcome. Chief among these is lack of c�r­
tainty, a recurring problem for plaintiffs in bonu
.
s cases.74 While 
employers frequently promise rewards for special eff�r�s, t�ey 
often fail to quantify a specific benefit. Without exphc1t .guid­
ance on the substance of the promise, many courts have simply 
denied recovery.n Other courts, however, have demonstrated a 
willingness to construe contracts to render no-binding-effect 
clauses inoperative, both in bonus76 and other benefit cases,77 or 
to recognize the possibility of recovery based on promissory 
estoppel.78 
Kroger Co., 259 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (bonus not earned where plaintiff was 
discharged for sufficient cause). 
73. See, e.g., Albertson v. Ralston Purina Co., 586 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), 
involving a claim for severance pay. The court held that a policy to pay, "in limited and 
exceptional cases, a gratuity to a separated employee" constituted an illusory promise. 
Id. at 777 (emphasis in original). This promise could also have failed for lack of definite­
ness. See infra notes 74-75. 
74. In one of the classic cases dealing with lack of certainty, Varney v. Ditmars, 217 
N.Y. 223, 226, 111 N.E. 822, 823 ( 1916), the court refused to enforce an employer's prom­
ise to pay "a fair share of my profits" as a bonus. 
75. See, e.g., Sandeman v. Sayres, 50 Wash. 2d 539, 314 P.2d 428 (1957) (no dis­
claimer, but bonus provision in employment contract merely stated that a "suitable in­
centive . . .  will be decided upon"); Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 199, 665 
P.2d 414 (1983) (employee fired for cause not entitled to bonus where employer retained 
discretion as to amount); Calkins v. Boeing Co., 8 Wash. App. 347, 506 P.2d 329 ( 1973) 
(suggestion bonus; rules referred to amount of cssh award, "if any," as totally within the 
company's discretion). The presence vel non of a disclaimer thus seems much less signifi­
cant than the unwillingness of courts to "make" a contract for the parties. It appears, 
however, that the presence of a disclaimer may have influenced certain courts to deny 
alternative claims for recovery in restitution, presumably on the basis that under the 
circumstances the plaintiff was acting as a volunteer. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 
1 1 2  ( 1936); II G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.1 ( 1978). 
76. See Osborn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 309 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962) (language too 
uncertain to support summary judgment for employer on basis that it had reserved abso­
lute discretion to appropriate a valuable idea without compensation; both quasi-contract 
and contract implied-in-fact theories mentioned); Allen D. Shadron, Inc. v. Cole, 101 
Ariz. 122, 416 P.2d 555 (1966) (court severed language to find alternative promises, with 
discretionary language only 
.
modifying the promise to pay a bonus, not rendering it " illu­
sory"; thus employer promised to make a decision-"discretion" was not synonymous 
with "optional"). In each of these cases, the court ignored obvious problems of 
uncertainty. 
77.  See Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971) (claim for 
severance p��; ��urt con�trued "management approval" language to apply only to verifi­
cation of ehg1b1hty requirements). 
78. Kari v. General Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978), reu'g 79 
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Critical analysis of these cases, then, suggests a conclusion 
similar to that reached as to the pension and death benefit cases: 
given a statement of commitment by an employer to pay a defi­
nite or reasonably calculable monetary benefit, courts have gen­
erally endeavored to find a basis to enforce the commitment. 
The presence of a no-binding-effect clause, disclaimer or reser­
vation of d iscretion will generally not preclude recovery, so long 
as the employee has rendered the requested performance, his re­
liance was reasonable, and his claim is not impaired by extrinsic 
infirmities. An expression of intent not to be bound appears rel­
evant primarily when it  complements another basis for 
nonenforcement. 
Any conclusion regarding the status of the freedom not to 
contract is  premature, however ,  without examination of a wholly 
separate category of cases. Letters of intent, which feature no­
binding-effect language similar to that utilized in employer-em­
ployee cases, add new considerations to the issue o f  assent. 
II. LETTERS OF INTENT 
Documents styled "letters of intent" or "memoranda of un­
derstanding" are commonly encountered in business transac­
tions. 79 The use of letters o f  intent has long been ubiquitous in 
the securities industry in negotiations for firm commitment un­
derwriting. 80 They may be used, however, in almost any com­
mercial negotiations, including m ergers and other corporate ac­
quisitions, 81 sales of ongoing businesses82 and other asset 
purchases,83 financing and loan agreements,84 real estate transac­
tions,8is personal property transactions,86 and agreements 
Mich. App. 93, 26 1 N.W.2d 222 (1977). 
79. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 37, at 117 & n.3. 
80. C. ISRAELS & G. DuFF, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 70-71 ( 1 962); Wheat & 
Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAW. 539, 553-54 (1960). 
81. G. McCARTHY, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 129·30 (1963); see, e.g., Itek Corp. v. 
Chicago Aerial Indus., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968). 
82. E.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F. Supp. 597 
(S.D.N.Y. 197 1 ) ;  I.H. Rubenstein & Son v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 222 So. 2d 329 (La. 
Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757, 226 So. 2d 521 (1969). 
83. E.g., Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33 (Alaska 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 ( 1984). 
84. E.g. , Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way Assocs., 388 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1968). 
85. E.g., Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Clark, 3 Wash. App. 1001, 478 P.2d 752 
(1970). 
86. E.g., Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 517 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
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relating to entertainment and artistic services and products,37 
among others.88 Although often couched in the form of a mutual 
commitment, these "agreements" frequently include no-binding­
effect clauses.89 The reasons for the use of these devices may dif­
fer according to the circumstances of each transaction. 
In firm commitment underwriting, the use of letters of in­
tent is highly structured. The issuer contemplating a public of­
fering of securities seeks an expression of assurance from the un­
derwriter that it will go forward with the offering, absent some 
extraordinary occurrence. Without this assurance, the issuer is 
hesitant to incur the substantial expense of registering the offer­
ing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. By the same 
token, the underwriter is unwilling to undertake a legal obliga­
tion at a time when SEC approval is still forthcoming and may 
not materialize. Thus, the letter of intent constitutes primarily a 
moral commitment by the underwriter that it will perform if the 
registration statement becomes effective. While the agreement 
sets forth the general terms of the offering, the underwriter's 
compensation, and possibly other terms, invariably it will specif­
ically negate the existence of any legal commitment by either 
party.90 This provision is, of course, chiefly for the underwriter's 
benefit. Nonetheless, since there have been few instances of 
(court treated contract of sale as letter of intent). 
87. See Taddeo, Agreeing to Agree: The Importance of Correctly Drafting a Letter 
of Intent, N.Y.L.J., April 5, 1985, at 5, col. 1.  
88. The precise usage described here is  limited to business settings. The question 
of whether an "agreement" evidences a contractual obligation as opposed to a nonbind­
ing statement of mere intent can, of course, arise in other contexts. See, e.g., Feick v. 
Fleener, 653 F.2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1981), discussed infra note 99. 
89. Obviously, this is not universally true. When the intent not to be bound is un­
expressed, writings frequently give rise to "formal contract contemplated" cases. The 
issue then becomes whether the parties intended to be bound at present, or only upon 
the execution of a future, more detailed document. For a discussion of these cases, see 
supra note 17 and the authorities cited therein. 
90. See authorities cited supra note 80. The following is a typical no-binding-effect 
clause: 
This memorandum is accepted by the Company, and by Mr. X on behalf of the 
selling stockholders, as a statement of mutual intention at this time to effect 
the proposed transactions along the lines indicated above, but it does not con­
stitute any commitment on the part of the Company, the selling stockholders 
or any underwriter except as to assumption of expenses as aforesaid. Such a 
commitment will be undertaken only under the aforementioned underwriting 
agreement if our customary form shall have been entered into among the Com­
pany, the selling stockholders and the underwriters, all acting severally. 
C. ISRAELS & G. DUFF, supra note 80, at 309. 
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unjustified default by underwriters,91 these agreements provide 
issuers with sufficient comfort to justify the out-of-pocket ex­
penditures that precede the offering.92 
In other contexts, letters of intent may be used where intra­
corporate or regulatory authorization is a necessary prerequisite 
to consummation of a transaction. Parties who have not yet 
completed negotiations on all material terms may use a letter of 
intent to memorialize the substance of their agreement at its 
current stage and to provide an impetus to consummate the bar­
gain. Letters of intent may also be useful where other conditions 
to closing are imposed by either party. 
The true letter of intent is, at least to some degree, a mutu­
ally negotiated document. This would suggest that in ordinary 
circumstances, the expression of intent not to contract would go 
unchallenged. Inevitably, however, a party who renders perform­
ance subsequent to the execution of the letter may feel aggrieved 
if the other party elects to exercise his "freedom" not to pro­
ceed. Such circumstances test the extent of the freedom not to 
contract. 
Perhaps the best-known case seeking enforcement of a let­
ter of intent, Dunhill Securities Corp. v. Microthermal Applica­
tions, Inc. ,93 involved securities underwriting, the industry in 
which the use of such documents is probably the most widely 
accepted. 94 Even more interesting is the fact that the under­
writer, normally the beneficiary of the no-binding-effect clause 
and its drafter in this case, brought the action. The plaintiff was 
to act as principal underwriter for a proposed offering of the de­
fendant's common stock. The parties entered into a letter of in­
tent which provided, in pertinent part: 
91. C. ISRAELS & G. DuFF, supra note 80, at 70; Wheat & Blackstone, supra note 80, 
at 553. 
92. While, at least in theory, the letter of intent has only the sanction of conscience 
to insure its performance, even the execution of a formal underwriting agreement does 
not provide absolute assurance to the issuer. Underwriters have long incorporated "mar­
ket out" provisions allowing them to withdraw from a formal underwriting agreement in 
the event of sufficiently material adverse developments in the securities markets. See C. 
ISRAELS & G. DuFF, supra note 80, at 78-79; Gourrich, Investment Banking Methods 
Prior to and Since the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 44, 56 (1937); 
see, e.g. , Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (1948). 
93. 308 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
94. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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Since this instrument consists only of an expressi?n 
-
�f our 
mutual intent, it is expressly understo?d that no hab1hty or 
obligation of any nature whatsoever is mte�ded to �e crea�ed 
as between any of the parties hereto. This letter is not m­
tended to constitute a binding agreement to consumm�te the 
financing outlined herein, nor an agreement to enter mto an 
Underwriting Agreement . . . .  In the event that the Under­
writing Agreement is not executed and/or the p urchase of the 
securities is not consummated, [the Underwriter] shall not be 
obligated for any expenses of the Company or for any charges 
or claims whatsoever arising out of this letter of intent or the 
proposed financing or otherwise and, similarly, the Company 
shall not be, in any way, obligated to [the Underwriter].ee 
After approximately two months, during which each party took 
certain actions pursuant to the letter, the company discovered 
that the SEC had previously instituted three separate enforce­
ment proceedings against the underwriter. It promptly wrote the 
underwriter to terminate their relationship.96 The underwriter 
sued to enforce the letter of intent as a binding agreement or, 
alternatively, to obtain restitution for the value of its services 
performed and for its out-of-pocket expenditures. 
The court rejected both claims. On the contract claim, the 
opinion quoted Professor Williston: " 'It is indeed true that if 
the parties to an agreement undertake that no legal obligation 
shall be created, their undertaking in this r egard will be 
respected by the law, as would any other term of their agree­
ment, provided neither the agreement nor the stipulation itself 
is illegal. '  "97 Since there was no ambiguity in their expressions, 
the court stated that the parties could not be bound unless and 
until a formal underwriting agreement was executed. The deci­
sion emphasized the customary usage of letters of intent in the 
securities industry, making it clear that such documents are only 
regarded as tentative expressions of intention. 
Regardi�g the quantum meruit claim, the court simply 
�tated that smce _
the underwriter expressly waived compensation 
·� t?e letter of •�te�t, it could not claim restitutionary relief. 
S1m1larly, the plamttff's k nowledge of practices in the securities 
9fi. :l08 F. Supp. at 197. 
96. Id. at 196-97. 
91. Id. at 1 97 (quoting 1 S. W1LL1STON, supra note 5, § 21). 
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industry relating to registration of public offerings precluded 
any argument that the underwriter had acted in reliance upon 
the company's implied request.98 
Dunhi ll is strong evidence that the freedom not to contract 
is still viable.99 What remains, however, is to determine its reach. 
This inquiry should begin with an analysis of Dunhill itself. It 
is, notably, a brief opinion. The court perceived the operative 
issue in fairly straightforward terms; the language of the deci­
sion offers little suggestion of variable factors that might have 
dictated a contrary result. In addition to expressed intent, two 
facts appear determinative. The first is that there was little per­
formance prior to the company's letter of termination. Thus, the 
parties' relationship was still in a fairly executory posture. 100 
Even more significant, however, was the industry-wide prac­
tice involving letters of intent. Their wide-spread use by securi­
ties professionals meant that the underwriter could not seriously 
allege that it believed the letter to be a binding commitment. 
Moreover, no disparity in bargaining power was evident. Given 
the understanding of the nature of such documents in the finan­
cial industry, the court might have reached the same result even 
absent the no-binding-effect clause.101 In either instance, the 
98. 308 F. Supp. at 198. The broader question of compensation for performance 
pursuant to a letter of intent is discussed from the English perspective in Ball, Work 
Carried Out in Pursuance of Letters of Intent-Contract or Restitution?, 99 L.Q. REV. 
572 (1983). The author makes the point that the focus upon intent in cases involving 
compensation for partial performance based on a letter of intent obscures the operative 
issue of the extent of legal liability. Id. at 586. He argues that restitutionary relief is too 
limited in many circumstances, and that a flexible approach is needed to protect justified 
expectations; where appropriate, a hybrid restitution-contract liability should be en­
forced by the imposition of implied terms. Id. at 580, 587-90. 
99. Of course, Dunhill is not the only evidence, as the previous discussion of 
Spooner illustrates. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. 
100. This decision supports Professor Atiyah's assertion that classical contract the­
ory's requirement of intent to create legal relations "is concerned with executory agree­
ments alone." The greater the extent of reliance, the more likely a court will use various 
fictions to "manufacture" the requisite intent. P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 12, 
at 758. 
101. A common usage denying the legal effect of certain types of agreements can 
give rise to a conclusive presumption that all such agreements are unenforceable. For 
example, English courts have consistently held that co,llective bargaining agreements are 
not subject to legal action because of the "climate of opinion" that the parties to such do 
not intend to be bound. See Ford Motor Co. v. Amalgamated Union of Eng'g & Foundry 
Workers, ( 1969] 2 Q .B. 303, 331 (bargaining agreements "remain in the realm of under­
takings binding in honour"). By statute, these agreements are now conclusively pre­
sumed unenforceable absent specific language stating that the parties intend for them to 
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court would have been justified in finding that reliance upon the 
letter was unreasonable. Thus, while expressed intent is one op­
erative element in the decision, it is by no means the only salient 
one. 
Subsequent cases citing Dunhill have not dealt with the 
specific issue in that case, that is, the enforceability of  an under­
writer's letter of intent. 1°2 Indeed, only one of Dunhill's progeny 
deals with a true letter of intent.103 That case, Garner v. Boyd, 104 
be legally binding. Trade Union & Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 18. See W. 
ANSON, supra note 5, at 66-67; CHESHIRE & FIFOOT's LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 5, at 
104-05; Hepple, Intention to Create Legal Relations, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122, 122-24 
(1970). 
102. In fact, no case has been found in which a similar attempt has been made. 
103. Two cases citing Dunhill have characterized the writings a t  issue as "letters of 
intent," but neither involved a true no-binding-effect clause. One case, Feick v. Fleener, 
653 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1981), involved a dispute among related heirs over the existence of 
an agreement to share legal fees stemming from litigation instituted by their decedent 
and pursued by one group of heirs. The other group elected not to join in the litigation 
and expressed their unwillingness to make a commitment to share expenses. A letter 
written by a member of this group suggested, however, that if his interest in the estate 
were enhanced by the litigation, he would pay his fair share of expenses. The letter ex­
pressed a desire to meet and resolve mutual differences on this and other issues affecting 
the estate. When the litigation proved successful, the other heirs sought to force the 
writer's group to pay its proportionate share of the legal fees. 
In rejecting the claim, the court held that the language of the letter explicitly indi­
cated that the writer intended not to be bound. While the writer stated expressly that he 
would share in the expenses if he were benefitted, the court saw this in the larger context 
of an "offer" only to meet and negotiate towards a settlement of many differences. Thus, 
as in Dunhill, there was no "promise" upon which the plaintiffs could rely. Moreover, 
even if there had been, the plaintiffs could demonstrate no inducement or change in 
position; they had already bargained for the attorney's services and committed to pay 
the fee before the letter was written. Id. at 79. 
The other case, Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v.  Hastings, 517 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), involved what was in effect a fraudulent transfer. On February 25, 1981, the court 
had ordered Filmvideo to deliver to Hastings 23 Hopalong Cassidy motion pictures. 
When Filmvideo failed to comply, Hastings brought an action for contempt. At that 
point, Filmvideo stated for the first time that it could not comply because it had pur­
portedly sold the pictures to Vanguard Film Corporaton on December 14, 1979. The 
court concluded that the agreement between F ilmvideo and Vanguard was a nonbinding 
letter of intent. In �upport of this, the court noted that while each had signed the docu­
ment, it lacked their corporate seals, and used the words "will assign," which showed no 
present transfer. The court ordered Filmvideo and Vanguard to surrender the films or 
face a $10,000 fine. Id. at 68. 
Presented with Filrnvi�eo's postjudgment story that, two years before litigating 
property rights to the fil�s, 1� had sold them to a third party, it is hardly surprising that 
the court would return F1lmv1deo a�d Vanguard to their predealing status. Also notewor­
thy was that the pictures had been m v.angu�rd's possession from the outset of the origi­
nal litigation. (Part of the alleged cons1derat1on for the "sale" was Vanguard's cancella­
tion of accrued storage fees. Id. at 67.). 
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serves as an important qualification to the freedom not to 
contract. 
In Garner, certain principals of Standard Milling Company, 
a company in financial distress, organized a second corporation, 
United's A merican Milling & Manufacturing Company, for the 
purpose of acquiring Standard's assets. Those assets were trans­
ferred through foreclosure on April 1, 1969, b y  a deed to 
United's American, even though United's American's corporate 
charter was not issued until April 20, 1969. No stock of United's 
American was ever issued and no new capital was paid into it; it 
continued Standard's operation with the same assets, properties 
and personnel. On April 15, 1 969, Standard was adjudicated a 
bankrupt. 
In the interim, certain individual defendants signed a letter 
of intent to exchange United's American's stock for stock in 
United American Industries, Inc., a separate Arizona corpora­
tion. Although this letter was subsequently rescinded, the stock 
of the Arizona corporation was delivered to the defendants prior 
to cancellation of the agreement. 
Standard's trustee in bankruptcy instituted an action 
against the individual defendants to obtain possession of the 
stock of the Arizona corporation. The court found a common 
scheme by the def end ants to transfer the assets of the bankrupt 
corporation to a new concern in order to defraud the bankrupt's 
creditors. Employing conflict-of-interest principles, the court 
reasoned that the defendants, as trustees of the corporation, had 
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the corporation 
and that the profits they gained were therefore the corporation's 
property. As successor in interest to the corporation, the trustee 
was entitled to the stock. 105 
In an effort to defeat the trustee's claims, the defendants 
argued that the agreement with the Arizona corporation was a 
nonbinding letter of intent that had been rescinded. The court 
rejected this assertion, stating simply that " [t]he instrument 
designated as a letter of intent of April 11 ,  1969 i s  in reality a 
104. 330 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 
1971) .  
105. Id. at 26-27 
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contract."106 Distinguishing the "true letter of intent" in 
Dunhill the court found that the document included all essen­
tial ter�s of the contract in "clear and unambiguous" lan­
guage. 107 More significantly, however, those clear and unam bigu­
ous promises had been performed, in effect, before rescission. 108 
Thus, the "letter of intent" was not merely a memorial of a 
"preliminary understanding."109 It was now an executed con­
tract, and the bankrupt, whose assets were the only property 
traded to the Arizona corporation, was entitled to that contract's 
benefits. 1 10 
The court does not reproduce the language of the April 1 1  
letter, and i t  i s  unclear whether it explicitly incorporated a no­
binding-effect clause. Had it contained one, it is safe to say that 
it would not have affected the outcome. Regardless of the com­
mon understanding of the effect given to letters of intent, Gar­
ner makes it clear that such expressions are significant only to 
an essentially executory agreement. Once one side has rendered 
substantial performance, parties cannot safely rely upon expres­
sions of intent to effect a return to the status quo ante.1 1 1  Thus, 
the freedom not to contract must at least be qualified to this 
extent: even where a writing may be understood in ordinary us­
age not to represent a legal obligation, it will acquire increas­
ingly binding characteristics as performance overlaps inten­
tion.112 For the drafter who seeks to memorialize a tentative 
106. Id. at 25. 
107. Id. at 26. 
108. Id. The nature of the individual defendants' performance is unclear. The let­
ter provided for the exchange of "the absolute complete ownership of United's American 
Milling & Manufacturing Co." for 1 ,733,333 shares in the Arizona corporation. Id. at 25. 
Presumably this referred to a stock exchange, yet no United's American stock was ever 
issued. It would appear that the Arizona corporation at least assumed control of United's 
American's operations. 
109. Id. at 25-26. 
1 10. Id. 
1 1 1 .  Of course, the element of creditor protection was a powerful impetus to the Garner court's refusal to cha�acterize :he letter as lacking legal efficacy. However, this 
does not detract from the ultimate pomt of the decision: recitals alone are not enough. 
1 12. Similar results might also be reached by arguing that, while the letter of in-
tent is not itself enforceable, subsequent actions of the parties may imply the existence 
of promises; the letter may �hen be persuasive evidence of the content of those promises. 
An interesting comparison to Garner is I.H. Rubenstein & Son, In c. v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 222 So. 2d 329 (La .. Ct. "':PP· 1st Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757, 226 So. 
2d 521 ( 1969) , o�e of t.he fe
w cases m whic
_
h the no-binding-effect clause was as explicit 
as that in Dunhtll. At issue was a letter of mtent concerning the plaintiff's purchase of a 
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agreement while preserving the flexibility to withdraw in the fu­
ture, the best alternative is to employ express conditions to­
gether with no-binding-effect language.us 
Two recent decisions, however, suggest that even these pre­
cautions may b e  insufficient to insulate the parties from contrac­
tual liability. In American Cya namid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden 
Sales Corp. , 1 1 4 the defendants, Elizabeth Arden Sales Corpora­
tion and the executors of the estate of Elizabeth Arden, entered 
into a letter agreement with Cyanamid for the sale of the assets 
and business of the defendant corporation. The letter recited 
division of the defendant's business. The letter was signed on March 22, 1968, with clos­
ing to occur on March 30. On March 26, defendant notified the plaintiff that it did not 
intend to go forward. The plaintiff sued for breach, arguing that the letter was a binding 
sales agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss based upon the letter's last clause: 
"It is expressly understood that this is a Letter of Intent and that no lia­
bility or obligation of any nature whatsoever is intended to be created between 
the parties hereto. This letter is not intended to constitute a binding agree­
ment to consummate the transaction outlined herein, nor an agreement to 
enter into a final agreement. The parties propose to proceed promptly and in 
good faith to prepare a final agreement providing for the transaction contem­
plated herein. In the event that such final agreement is not executed, neither 
party shall have any obligation to the other for expenses or otherwise." 
Id. at 330 (quoting Letter of Intent). In upholding dismissal of the plaintiff's action, the 
court stated that, notwithstanding the thorough detail of the letter of intent, it could not 
be binding in light of the "plain, clear and unequivocal" language that "the parties did 
not intend to be bound." Id. at 331. 
Two additional features of this case should be considered. One is the court's recogni­
tion that no-binding-effect clauses are countenanced by the Louisiana Civil Code. Ru­
benstein, 222 So. 2d at 331; see LA. Crv. CooE ANN. arts. 1813-1815 (West 1986). Second, 
although the closing of the transaction was to take place but a short time after the sign­
ing of the letter, defendant rescinded the letter only four days after it was signed. Plain­
tiff apparently took no action in reliance upon the letter. Under these circumstances no 
countervailing considerations existed to influence the court to view the letter at other 
than face value. 
113. See In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 25 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(letter making offer to purchase, though arguably couched in sufficiently definite terms, 
was only offer to negotiate where conditioned on board approval, due diligence investiga­
tion, and execution of mutually acceptable purchase agreement); cf. Alaska N. Dev., Inc. 
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1983) (letter of intent reciting that it 
was subject to approval of committee could not be supplemented by oral evidence that 
committee's discretion was limited only to review of price; summary judgment for de­
fendant in breach of contract action affirmed), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984). As 
previously noted, this is the common practice of lenders in loan commitment letters. See 
supra discussion at note 17. But cf. Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So. 
2d 894 (Miss. 1 974) (action of insurance company in refusing to make loan for unrelated 
reasons prevented and excused borrowers from performing necessary conditions; thus 
loan commitment was binding contract). 
1 14. 331  F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).  
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that consummation was "conditioned upon the execution of a. 
mutually satisfactory purchase agreement and, on the part of 
Cyanamid, the approval of its board of directors. '�1 15  Subse­
quently the defendants received and accepted a higher �ff er 
from Eli Lilly and Company. Thereafter the defendants notified 
Cyanamid of the sale of the corporation to Lilly. The same.day that the notice was received, Cyanamid's board formally ratified 
the letter agreement and authorized legal action against the 
defendants. 
In analyzing the nature of the letter agreement, the court 
rejected the defendants' contention that it was a mere "memo­
randum of understanding." In the court's view, the document 
contained all of the essential subject matter elements necessary 
for a contract. 116 The problem was instead "mutuality of obliga­
tion." Since Cyanamid could not be bound without its board's 
approval, the letter could obligate neither party until that 
time.117 This, however, did not mean that the defendants were 
free to revoke what was otherwise a valid offer. Rather, the court 
stated that the letter might have constituted an irrevocable off er 
under New York law.118 If so, formal acceptance by the board of 
Cyanamid would have created a binding contract. The court be­
lieved that a full evidentiary hearing was necessary on this issue. 
Accordingly, the corporate defendant's motion for summary 
115. Id. at 602 n.3. Since the letter agreement apparently did not include an ex· 
plicit no-binding-effect clause, Elizabeth Arden may be classified more precisely under 
the rubric of "formal contract contemplated" cases. See supra discussion at note 17. 
116. 331 F. Supp. at 603. 
117. Id. at 605. 
118. Id. at 605 (citing N.Y. GEN. 0BLJG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 1978)). That stat· 
ute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
[W]hen an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing signed by the 
otferor, or by his agent, which states that the offer is irrevocable during a pe­
riod set forth or until a time fixed, the offer shall not be recovable during such 
period or until such time because of the absence of consideration for the assur­
ance of irrevocability. When such a writing states that the offer is irrevocable 
but does not state any period or time of irrevocability, it shall be construed to 
state that the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time. 
This statute, adopted in 1941, served as an analogue to § 2-205 of the Uniform Commer­
cia� Code o� �rm offers. The _purpose of each is to substitute the evidentiary function of a signed wr1tmg for the traditional requirement of separate consideration for an option 
contract . . C(. REs:r�TEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979) (offer valid as option 
contract if m wntmg and reciting a "purported" consideration). The existence of the 
New York statute m�y n�t have been determinative. A similar result could have been 
reached based on the 1mphed duty of good faith. See infra notes 126-29 and accompany­
ing text. 
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judgment was denied. 1 19 
The second case, Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Industries, 120 
moves the letter of intent even further towards the binding end 
of the continuum between contract and no-contract. 1 21 The prin­
cipal stockholders of the defendant, CAI, negotiated an agree­
ment whereby Itek was to purchase all of CAi's assets. Thereaf­
ter Itek and CAI executed a letter of intent which provided: 
"Itek and CAI shall make every reasonable effort to agree 
upon and have prepared as quickly as possible a contract pro­
viding for the foregoing purchase by Itek and sale by CAI, sub­
ject to the approval of CAI stockholders, embodying the above 
terms and such other terms and conditions as the parties shall 
agree upon. If the parties fail to agree upon and execute such a 
contract they shall be under no further obligation to one 
another. "122 
While subsequent negotiations were taking place, CAi's 
principal shareholders renewed discussions with a third party, 
Bourns, Inc., concerning the purchase of their stock by Bourns. 
Based upon misrepresentatons by these individuals that negotia­
tions with Itek were at an impasse, 123 Bourns made a formal of­
fer to purchase their stock on February 25, 1965. The stockhold­
ers accepted the next day.124 On March 2, CAI notified Itek that 
negotiations were terminated due to "unforeseen circumstances" 
and the failure to reach an agreement.1211 Thereupon, Itek filed 
suit. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed summary judg­
ment in favor of CAI. In response to CAi's reliance upon the no­
binding-effect clause, the court stated that all provisions of the 
paragraph must be considered together, including the undertak-
1 19. 331 F. Supp. at 606-07. The court dismissed the executors on the grounds that 
the attempted revocation was solely the act of the corporate defendant, and that the 
executors were merely acting in what they justifiably viewed as the best interests of the 
estate in pursuing the higher offer by Eli Lilly. Id. at 607. 
120. 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968). 
121. See Knapp, supra note 17, at 676. 
122. 248 A.2d at 627 (quoting letter of intent). 
123. Earlier on the same day that the stockholders made this statement to Bourns, 
they had met with Itek. At that meeting Itek had acceded to additional terms upon 
which CAI had insisted. Id. at 628. 
124. Bourns's offer would have resulted in a return of an additional $3.00 per 
share. 
125. 248 A.2d at 628. 
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ing to "make every reasonable effort" to agree upon the terms of 
a formal contract. This provision obligated each party to at­
tempt in good faith to reach a final and formal agreement. Only 
if these "best efforts" proved futile would the parties be ab­
solved from further obligations.126 Thus, there was sufficient evi­
dence to warrant a finding that both parties intended to be 
bound, subject to what was in effect a condition subsequent that 
failure to reach a final agreement after good faith negotiation 
would discharge them.127 Further, the evidence justified the con­
clusion that CAI had breached its duty to proceed in good 
faith.128 
Itek, then, strongly suggests another qualification of the 
freedom not to contract: one seeking the shelter of a no-binding­
effect clause must observe the overriding demands of good faith. 
The Itek court rightly refused to allow artificial recitals of inten­
tion to supersede this fundamental duty. Expectations emanat­
ing from a promise may take many forms, depending upon its 
content, while the content may determine in part whether those 
expectations are justifiable. In all events, however, parties to 
contracts, or contractual negotiations, are entitled to rely upon 
the expectation that their counterparts will act according to at 
least minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing. Itek 
promises that this interest will be protected despite superficial 
denials of contractual intent.129 
126. Id. at 629. 
127. The Second Restatement would characterize this as an event that terminates 
a duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1979). 
128. 248 A.2d at 629. The individual stockholders were dismissed on the grounds 
that no contract could arguably exist between them and Itek. 
129. The comments to the Second Restatement recognize this implicit limitation 
on the freedom not to contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21, re­
porter's note to comment b (1979). For a comprehensive discussion of the question of 
unjustifiable withdrawal from negotiations, see Knapp, supra note 17. Restitution of 
benefits conferred on the other negotiating party is a further possibility for protecting 
the interests of parties to letters of intent. The potential for a quantum meruit claim 
seems obvious, although s�ch arguments have not often arisen in American cases, pre­
sumably because of t.he dt�culty of establishing the benefit. See generally Ball, supra 
note 98, at 575-80 (dtscussmg English cases but concluding that restitutionary recovery 
will ordinarily be too limited to provide adequate protection to the performing party). 
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Ill THE FREEDOM NoT TO CONTRACT AND MonERN CONTRACT 
LAW 
This article posits initially that intent is in retreat as an in­
dependent element of contractual liability. The foregoing 
analysis clearly supports this conclusion, thereby calling into 
question a fundamental tenet of traditional contract law. The 
final inquiry of this article asks if other contract theories can 
better explain these decisions. Certainly the narrow scope of this 
subject provides n o  basis upon which to proffer a comprehensive 
theory of contractual obligation. In the final determination of 
the scope of the freedom not to contract, however, it is u seful to 
consider how these decisions may fit within the framework of 
contemporary contract thought. Three alternative theories, reli­
ance, status, and relation, are instructive in this study. 130 
A. Reliance 
Among the most dramatic developments in legal theory in 
this century has been the proliferation of reliance-based liabili­
ties.131 In contract law, promises rendered enforceable by virtue 
of promissory estoppel are the most obvious example. The devel­
opment of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is too well-docu­
mented to repeat here. 132 In cases in which recovery has been 
granted notwithstanding the presence of a no-binding-effect 
clause, promissory estoppel has frequently been advanced to ex­
plain or justify the result. 133 This has particularly been true of 
130. In a series of recent articles, Professor Melvin Eisenberg has developed a 
reconceptualization of contract law that he terms the "responsive model." He argues that 
contract principles should be based upon two fundamental considerations: fairness, de­
termined by notions of conventional morality, and policy, determined by efficiency and 
administrability. Thus, the determination of the principles to govern a specific issue 
should be individualized or standardized, and subjective or objective, depending upon an 
analysis of that issue in terms of fairness and policy. See Eisenberg, The Responsive 
Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 107, 1 1 1 1  (1984). Because this work is still in 
its formative stage, n o  attempt has been made to analyze the subject cases in terms of 
this model. 
131. See P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 12, at 771. Professor Atiyah would 
add to this a belief in the resurgence of benefit-based liabilities, a development that is 
perhaps more common in England than in America. Ultimately, he views the binding 
force of promises as flowing from the promise's function as an admission of other obliga­
tions between the parties, most of which arise from benefits to the promisor or reliance 
by the promisee. See P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, supra note 12, at 193-215. 
132. For a summary of this topic see Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2, at 482-508. 
133. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 14, § 6-11,  at 2 16; Metzger & 
Phillips, supra note 2, at 521-22 & n.333. 
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the employer-employee cases. This analysis is too simplistic, 
however. To characterize such cases as Tilbert, Schofield, Mab­
ley, and Psutka as merely illustrations of the applicatio� of the 
principle of Section 90 of the Restatement n ot only m1sst�tes 
the nature of the doctrine, but ignores a substantial body of sim­
ilar cases in which clear acts of reliance have not been 
compensated. 
In its traditional sense, promissory estoppel has often been 
characterized as a substitute for consideration. It was the basis 
for granting relief to one who had relied upon a promise even 
though the promisor had not sought that reliance. 13" In the 
death benefit and pension cases, finding consideration is not a 
problem. As previously noted, it takes but little judicial imagina­
tion to imply a request that the employee continue the faithful 
performance of his duties in "exchange" for the promise of the 
future benefit.13& This rationalization, however, presupposes the 
existence of a promise, and that begs the very question at hand. 
Presumably the purpose of a no-binding-effect clause is the ne­
gation of promise, leaving one with nothing upon which to rely, 
reasonably or unreasonably.136 At the same time, these clauses 
frequently have been coupled with other expressions that can 
only be regarded as inducements to performance. While many 
opinions employ the catchword "reliance,'' under traditional 
analysis the absence or presence of reliance is significant only 
where one begins with a promise. This is the fundamental ele­
ment that courts in the foregoing opinions have b een forced to 
supply, ignore, or honor. Til bert and its kin are not, then, 
"promissory estoppel" cases, although they may be harbingers of 
a broader,  more amorphous species of liability based on reliance 
alone. 137 
134. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 53; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2 at 482-508. 
135. Nor, for those inclined to symmetry in such matters, have courts h�d difficulty 
in perceiving the benefits enjoyed by employers as the result. 
136. See Grismore, supra note 29, at 702-03; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 2, at 
494-98. 
137. See G. G1LMORE, supra note 1 2, at 66. To Gilmore, this might illustrate one of 
the areas where contract has been absorbed by tort, with the result that any reliance on 
an assuran�e must be recompense�. Id. at 87�88. Of course, courts have previously ap­
plied promissory estoppel to permit recovery m the absence of an enforceable promise. See Hoffman v .. 
Red Owl Stor�s, 26 Wi�. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 ( 1 965) (recovery for 
reliance expenditures of potent1a� franchisee allowed notwithstanding promise too indefi­
nite to enforce �s an offer). Outside of certain specific areas, however, it is arguable that Gilmore overestimates the conquest of contract by tort. See Speidel, The Borderland of 
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A more important determination is why, if reliance was the 
basis for recovery in Tilbert, it did not suffice for the plaintiffs 
in Spooner and other bonus cases. Any attempt to distinguish 
these cases by a qualitative analysis of the nature of the reliance 
in each is highly questionable.138 Moreover, if the reasonableness 
of reliance is the issue, no clear differences between the two lines 
emerge. That reliance might be unreasonable due to the nature 
of the language employed is equally as true in Tilbert and its 
fellows as in Spooner. If anything, it is more likely that an em­
ployee would rely upon the assurance of a performance bonus 
than a pension or death benefit because the rewards are much 
more immediate. 
As previously discussed, employees lost many of the bonus 
cases due to the lack of a definitely promised reward rather than 
because of the purported reservation of employer discretion;139 
this is consistent with the traditional requirement in promissory 
estoppel cases of a specific promise to be enforced. One comes 
full circle, however, to the lack of a true "promise" in cases like 
Tilbert. Thus, while elements of promissory estoppel may be im­
plicit in certain decisions, it offers no logically consistent expla­
nation for the results achieved throughout the broad spectrum 
of cases. 1•0 
B. Status 
In a well-known article, Professors Childres and Spitz pos­
ited that the manner in which courts interpret and enforce con­
tracts often can be explained by the status of the parties. w 
Contract, 10 N. Kv. L. REV. 163, 196 (1983). See generally Metzger & Phillips, supra note 
2, at 508·36 (discussing development of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of 
recovery). 
138. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
139. See supra notes 53, 74-75 and accompanying text. 
140. Besides Spooner, cases in which clear reliance interests of employees went un­
compensated include Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1971); 
Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927); Hughes v. Encyclo­
paedia Britannica, 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 1 1 7  N.E.2d 880 (1954); Kari v. General Motors 
Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 N.W.2d 222 ( 1977), rev'd per curiam, 402 Mich. 926, 282 
N.W.2d 925 (1978). 
141. Childres & Spitz, supra note 11, at 2. The authors' definition of "status" in­
cludes both ascribed and achieved status. Id. at 2-3 n.5. This distinction is significant. 
Ascribed status is the status conferred upon a person by such qualities as heredity, age, 
or maturation. Achieved status is status obtained by a person's own efforts or initiative. 
See Rehbinder, supra note 11, at 954. 
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They suggested that, within certain defi�ed categor�es of cases, 
the results should be tested not simply m transact10nal terms, 
but according to the status of the parties involved. Taking as 
their sample cases involving the parol evidence rule, they con­
cluded that an analysis of those cases according to status was 
more predictive of results than an attempt to apply a u�itary 
parol evidence rule.142 While this methodology can be apphe? to 
the cases discussed in this article, no consistent conclusions 
emerge. 
Childres and Spitz suggested that, for analytical purposes, 
cases should be divided into three categories. "Formal con­
tracts" include those negotiated fairly and comprehensively be­
tween parties with some expertise and business sophistication 
and of relatively equal bargaining power. H3 "Informal contracts" 
are agreements between parties lacking the sophistication usu­
ally evident in the business world. 144 "Contracts involving abuse 
of the bargaining process" is a somewhat nebulous catchall cate­
gory involving disparity in bargaining power, lack of negotiation, 
and such obvious examples as adhesion contracts and contracts 
objectionable on the basis of unconscionability, public policy, 
fraud, duress, and similar grounds.m Most no-binding-effect 
cases fall within either the first or third categories. 
The true "letter of intent" cases would seem to be examples 
of formal contracts. One would expect that among parties of the 
same status, courts would be more willing to respect expressions 
of intent than when dealing with parties of unequal bargaining 
power. In the ordinary case, sophisticated parties dealing at 
arm's length could be expected to abide by the rules they impose 
upon themselves. Only in the event of some superseding flaw in 
the bargaining process should a court intervene to impose obli­
gations not voluntarily assumed. 
The letter of intent cases are in accord with this analysis. 
Dunhill presents no extrinsic reasons for disregarding the par­
ties' expressed intentionS.146 Conversely, Garner, Elizabeth Ar-
1 42. Childres & Spitz, supra note 1 1 , at 30. 
1 4:l. Id. at 4 .  
144. Id. at  4-5. 
145. Id. at 5. 
1 46. The same can be said of l.H. Rubenstein & Son, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co . .  22:! So. :!d :l29 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757, 226 So. 2d 521 
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den, and Itek introduce into the equation fairly blatant elements 
of bad faith and unfair dealing. 147 There is therefore nothing in­
consistent in those courts' willingness to supplement expressions 
of intent with duties of another sort. 
This neat analysis breaks down, however, when one consid­
ers the employment cases. These cases presumably would be 
classified as contract disputes involving abuse of the bargaining 
process. The p ejorative connotations of "abuse" may be mislead­
ing. What is meant is that these cases involve, at the very least, 
disparity i n  bargaining power and lack of mutual negotiation. 
One would expect that courts would demonstrate sympathy for 
employees and seek ways to ameliorate the impact of no-bind­
ing-effect clauses. Absent clear indicia that the employee under­
stood and accepted the nonbinding nature of the employer's 
words, decisions favoring employees would be predictable. 
Without repeating what has come before, suffice it to say 
that courts have offered only fitful support for this conclusion. 
With no palpable distinctions in the status of the parties, em­
ployees have been far more successful in the pension and death 
benefit cases1°'8 than in the bonus cases.149 Each line of cases, 
however, has been sufficiently inconsistent to suggest that sta­
tus-based analysis does not yield predictable results.160 
C. Relational Contracts 
In view of the multitude of scholars whose names are associ­
ated with the term, it is difficult to characterize precisely rela­
tional theories of contract. un Professor Ian Macneil, perhaps the 
preeminent contemporary relationist, uses the term relational 
contract theory to distinguish the transactional theory that is 
the basis of traditional contract law.1112 He identifies two funda­
mental flaws of traditional theory, discreteness and presentia-
(1969), discussed supra note 112. 
147. See supra notes 104-29 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra notes 20-59 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 53-54, 62-78 and accompanying text. 
150. Death benefit and pension cases in which employees were unsuccessful are 
discussed supra at notes 50, 52, 58-59. Bonus cases in which employees were sucessful 
are discussed supra at notes 66, 72, 75. 
151. For a list of some adherents, see supra note 12. 
152. See, e.g., Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 
VA. L. REV. 589, 592 (1974). 
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tion. Discreteness is "the separating of a transaction
 from all 
else between the participants at the same time and b
efore and 
after."1r.3 Presentiation is "the bringing of the future 
into the 
present."1M The transactional model of traditional d
octrine, 
then, fails for two fundame ntal reasons. First, it ignores 
the 
identity of the parties and, thereby, fails to consider any facto�
s 
outside of their immediate expressions of assent. lr.r. Second
, it 
attempts to force within those expressions the e ntire set 
of 
rights and obligations between the parties, so that all such mat­
ters would be fixed at the time of offer and acceptance.156 In 
each instance the goal to be served is the ideal o f  perfect plan­
ning for the future. m Since few economic exchanges occur in the 
discrete transactional pattern, however, the transactional model 
inevitably proves inadequate.1r.s Relationists accordingly seek a 
new structure based upon relational concepts rather than 
promise. 
Relational theory does not, then, purport to off er a more co­
gent theoretical basis to explain or rationalize contemporary 
case law, but seeks to formulate a model by which transactional 
theory can be reformed to rectify its inconsistencies, inadequa­
cies, and unfairness. This is to be achieved by recognizing rela­
tion as the central generating norm of obligations. u9 A critical 
problem faced by relationists is reconciliation of this norm with 
the demands of planners and the structural function of intent in 
d_efining relations. Relationists recognize that planning is a legit­
imate, if not primary, goal of contract law.160 Defining the role of 
1 5:3. I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 60. 
154. Id. 
1 55. Id. at 60-62. 
1 56. Macneil, supra note 152, at 593. 
157. l . MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 1 2  at 60 
. 
1 58. Macn�il, supra note 152, at 595-96. This inadequa�y manifests itself in three 
primary ways. First, most contemporary contracts are not the od t f · 1 t d t . . pr uc s o 1so a e rans-
actwns but rather involve ongoing dealings between the p t• n· t d t . ar 1es. 1scre eness ten s o 
bar all  such nonprom1ssory factors from consideration in d t · · h f , . e ermmmg t e content o con-
tracts. Second, the transactional theory's obsession with · ·d f ff t . ng1 concepts o o er, accep -
ance. and performance belies the reality that contracts freq ti h 1 ·d t
. 
. · d 
. . uen y ave no neat y 1 en 1-
tiable points of emarcat1on. Finally presentiation atte t t ti ll d · 
. 
. 
. 
• mp s o x a future ut1es 
without regard to unant1c1pated developments occurring ft th h · 
· ' · · l h . 
a er e exc ange of promises. 
l hus, trad1twna t eory must use either fictions or J·udici 1 fill" 
S.. L" 
8 gap mg to respond to unex-
µert.e<l on.'ur rences. · I'!' l!(htsey, supra note 7, at 49-56. 
I :l9. ('{. Fei n man , Critical Approaches tu Contract L 30 UCLA L 
· · 
h" aw, REV 829 857 
l 1 98:1) ( c haractermnl( t is quest as a somewhat utopi·an d ) · · ' , , en eavor . 
J 60. See I. MACNEii., SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 12 t 47· M . • a , acne1l, supra note 2, 
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intent in the new order presumably dictates a synthesis of rela­
tional and transactional principles;161 this challenge is likely to 
prove the strongest impediment to a workable relational theory. 
Because the freedom not to contract in its traditional sense is 
perhaps the ultimate expression of deference to intent, the cases 
discussed herein pose interesting questions: for example would a 
relational analysis suggest different results?162 If so, to the ex­
tent that statements of intent are denied primacy, can a rela­
tional corollary be articulated which would yield the "right" re­
sult in disparate cases? A negative response to this question may 
indicate that intent and the promise model, although weakened, 
will probably continue to dominate the foreseeable future of 
contract law. 
In determining the relational response to the freedom not to 
contract, the initial inquiry concerns the role of consent in the 
relational scheme. In a broad sense, relationists view expressions 
of intent as significant primarily to executory contracts of a dis­
crete nature. 163 When parties instead deal with one another on 
an ongoing basis, it is the relationship thus established that gen­
erates its own set of imperatives. These imperatives, in turn, 
should principally define the parties' rights and obligations.164 
One would thus expect that at a stage where the parties 
have as yet had no substantial dealings and their written expres­
sions serve only to define initially their respective obligations, 
agreed-upon terms should be accorded substantial force. Absent 
at 862. Indeed, Macneil has characterized the objective theory of contracts a s  "a massive 
effort to harmonize transactional contract law with basic social demands for stability of 
language." Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 12, at 812 n.344. 
161. Cf. Macneil, supra note 152, at 605 (discussing the impact of the Second Re­
statement in effecting this synthesis). 
162. In view of the lack of theoretical unity among proponents of relational 
thought, it should be recognized that any attempt to analyze the subject cases in rela­
tional terms is necessarily broad and tentative. Because Professor Macneil has developed 
what is to date the most coherent statement of relational considerations and objectives, 
the following disc·ussion draws heavily (although not exclusively) on his work. 
163. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, R1sE AND FALL, supra note 12, at 758; I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL 
CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 49-50 (discussing the "triggering role" of intent in contract 
obligations). 
164. See P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, supra note 12, at 193; C. FRIED, supra note 9, at 76; 
L. FULLER, supra note 12, at 44 (speaking of "customary" law); Macneil, Many Futures, 
supra note 12, at 715-16. Of course, there is no unanimity among relationists regarding 
why relations generate duties, the nature of the obligations thus created, or the exact 
interacti on between relation and promise. 
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a relationship (in anything beyond the b roadest societal sense of 
the term) which generates mutual imperatives, the parties'  ex­
pressed intent provides the clearest focus to determine their 
rights and duties. As the relationship progresses beyond its 
formative stage, the initial written expression may yield to the 
internal pressures of the parties' mutual dealings. From this per­
spective, the letter of intent cases appear entirely consistent. 
Dunhill, which involves only preliminary dealings and industry­
wide usages, makes intent preeminent. 16lj Garner, on the other 
hand, demonstrates that expressed intent must yield to p e rform­
ance, while Elizabeth Arden and Itek supplement written ex­
pressions of intent with imperatives growing out of duties cen­
tral to the developing relationship, the justifiable expectation o f  
good faith and fair dealing. In so doing, those courts reach re­
sults consonant with prevailing notions of commercial morality. 
Again, however, the employment cases present a less logical 
progression. Relationists have identified employer-employee 
agreements as among the most obvious examples of contracts 
peculiarly subject to relational considerations.166 Both death 
benefit187 and bonus cases168 have been cited to illustrate rela­
tion-based duties. Surely this is true in many instances, but the 
inconsistencies observed in the earlier discussion of these cases 
conversely illustrate both the strong influence of intent upon our 
contract system and the difficulties inherent in articulating rela­
tional guidelines that amount to anything more than the ad hoc 
judicial gapfilling so often criticized by relationists. 
This problem is apparent in Professor Macneil's discussion 
of Tilbert and Spooner. He characterizes both as attempts to 
Hifi. The lack of relational imperatives to supplement expressions of intent also 
may have ht'en dett'rminative in l .H. Rubenstein & Son, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson 
Co., '..!:l:l So. :ld :l:l9 ( La. Ct. App. lst Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 757, 226 So. 2d 521 
( 1969). discussed .•upra note l l 2. 
lf}li. S1•1•. t'.I( . .  L. F.ULLER • .  •upra note 12, at 8 1 ;  Macneil , supra note 152, at 595. Of 
cour�t'. rven courts nominally committed to traditional doct · h I d d nne ave ong ten e to ana-
lyze employer-employee contracts in ways that depart fro th · t. · od 1 . m e pns me promise m e .  ,-;,.,. P ATIYAH. R1sF. AND FALL . . �upra note 12  at 764· Ch'ld & S ·t 
'2. 
• , 1 res p1 z, supra note 1 1 ,  at 
tti7. -.; M · 1  
. 
• ,.,. 1 a('nei · -'Upra note 15'.l, at 600-0 1 ;  see a lso .�upra notes 18-60 and accom-
p1m\· 111ic 11• x 1 .  
l fiH. ,-.;,.,. I .  F1 11 1 F. R  supra note l:l  t 81  (d'  · 
· ·. · · · 
, a 1scussmg bonus cases as "instances 
whnr nrt111nR IM'tter, mteractinnR-Rpeak louder than words") · . I . 2 
7!1 and 11rrompanyinl( tt'xt. 
• 
• .-ee a so supra notes 6 -
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shoehorn essentially relational issues into an "unaccommodating 
format" based on traditional principles of presentiation189-a 
classic problem of square pegs and round holes. He asserts that 
in neither case is a black letter rule based on mutual assent and 
presentiation a satisfactory basis for decision. 170 He argues that 
the manifestations of intent are clearly at odds with the purpose 
of the employers' promises. He concludes that "[o] nly examina­
tion of the relational setting in which the proposals were made 
reveals principles for determining whether reliance was justified, 
reliance not primarily on the manifestations of quasi-nonassent 
but primarily on the relations of which those manifestations 
were only a small part."171 
This analysis is true; unfortunately it does not go far 
enough, not because it fails to demonstrate that Tilbert was de­
cided correctly but because it fails to provide a sufficient ration­
ale for concluding that the Spooner court was wrong. Consider­
ing the circumstances of each case, in neither were the parties in 
an executory posture; relationships of some standing were in­
volved. Strong expectations would be generated by those rela­
tionships, particularly when an employer who offered with one 
hand sought to withdraw with the other. In Tilbert only a uni­
lateral expression of intent existed to counterbalance these rela­
tional considerations; thus, few would quarrel with its result. In 
Spooner, however, one cannot dispense with intent so facilely. 
As previously noted, the Spooner plaintiffs manifested their "as­
sent" to the employer's offer by the classic objective means of 
signing it.172 While objective assent has never been equated with 
subjective understanding, the employees may have been aware 
of the ephemeral nature of the proposal. If that were true, then 
two challenges confront the relationists. The first is the possibil­
ity that the decision may be justifiable on this basis.173 If not, 
the second challenge is greater still: coherent guidelines must be 
formulated for determining when assent must yield to relations. 
169. Macneil, supra note 152, at 600. 
170. Id. at 601. Macneil speaks of Tilbert and Spooner in their context as illustra-
tions to sections 21 (formerly 218) and 45, respectively, of the Second Restatement. 
171.  Id. at 602. 
172. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
173. Even if this were true, the holding was not necessarily correct. Such a ration­
ale may be unduly penal. However, if, as Professor Gilmore has argued, tort has ab­
sorbed contract, perhaps those employees might be said to have assumed the risk of their 
employer's capriciousness. 
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The articulation of relational objectives and the design of a 
concomitant structure for decision remain the ultimate impedi­
ment for relationists, as indeed to proponents of all alternative 
contract theories. Both the planning demands of future bargain­
ers and the practical predilections of judges schooled in tradi­
tional theory compel the formulation of "rules."  Albeit flexible, 
imbued with a healthy measure of judicial discretion, and sub­
ject to the constantly shifting and expanding dictates of good 
faith, a decisionmaking construct is nonetheless mandated. 174 
The inconsistencies of the employment cases and the problem of 
formulating workable alternative bases for decision demonstrate 
the problems inherent in practical implementation of alternative 
models of contract.1111 For the immediate future, and perhaps 
much longer, the underpinnings of the traditional regime of in­
tent are likely to continue as the fundamental framework of our 
law of contract, although the continued evolution o f  contract 
theory will incorporate increasing recognition of relational 
factors.176 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article began by questioning the viability of the free­
dom not to contract incorporated in section 2 1  of the Restate­
ment (Second) of Contracts.177 An examination of defined cate­
gories of cases that invoke the right to exercise this freedom has 
shown that the Restatement formulation is too broad to serve as 
a predictor of judicial response. To the extent that the freedom 
not to contract is recognized, it allows bargainers to allocate 
risks between themselves by opting for a regime of nonenforce­
ment. 178 Commercial parties accordingly may exercise this free-
174. See Feinman, supra note 159, at 844, 860; Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at 
1322; cf. I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 86 (recognizing need for discrete 
legal principles in contract law, but emphasizing that such principles can never be 
absolute).  
175. Professor Macneil acknowledges this difficulty. See Macneil, supra note 152, 
at 605; cf. Feinman, supra note 159, at 860 (no alternative theory has been offered that 
leads inevitiably to the correct decision in each case). 
176. See Speidel, supra note 137, at 196-98 (predicting that courts dealing with 
complex contract transactions will develop a creative synthesis of contract and tort prin­
ciples under the general duty of good faith); cf. Blum & Wellman, supra note 9, at 937-
38 (arguing that mutual assent, as a constitutionally protected liberty, remains the fun­
damental standard of contract law). 
177. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
178. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at 1295 & n.73. 
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dom with a modicum of safety, but only insofar as their actions 
are consistent with their expressed intent and the accepted prac­
tices in their industry. Employers can take little comfort in this 
freedom, absent some extrinsic defect in their promises that oth­
erwise prevents those statements from constituting "offers," a 
clear indication of their employees' knowledge of the nonbinding 
nature of those statements, or the existence of other circum­
stances that would make reliance unreasonable. Apart from a 
possible in terrorem effect, disclaimers by employers are often 
only meaningless posturings. The Second Restatement's broad 
formulation of the freedom not to contract is, thus, an outmoded 
vestige of an era when a written statement of intent reigned su­
preme without regard to its relation to the actual understanding 
of the parties. 179 A realistic statement of this freedom must in­
corporate the qualifications and limitations of reliance, fair deal­
ing, and good faith. The Second Restatement should be under­
stood as in need of reform in this area. 180 
In light of this evidence of the waning influence of assent, 
this article has analyzed the implications of several representa­
tive cases on the present and future development of contract 
theory. Perhaps paradoxically, this analysis has demonstrated 
the enduring predominance of the promise model in judicial rea­
soning. No satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies ob­
served in these cases emerges when alternative theories are ana­
lyzed. Critical examination dramatically exposes the gaps 
existing between the abstract statements of those theories and 
179. Of course, expressions in contracts that are inconsistent with the reasonable 
beliefs and expectations of one of the parties are often a hallmark of unconscionability. 
Courts frequently use that doctrine to address unreasonable provisions. See, e.g. , Fort, 
Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 765, 785-94 
(1978). 
180. At a minimum, the black-letter rule of the Second Restatement should be 
reworded to state a principle of general application only in commercial transactions. It 
must be noted that many English authorities seem to accept the freedom not to contract 
on a fairly uncritical basis. See W. ANSON, supra note 5, at 66-69; CHESHIRE & FtFOOT's 
LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 5, at 102-04. But cf. Hepple, supra note 101 (arguing that 
courts should abandon separate requirement of intention and rest enforceability solely 
on presence vel non of bargain). It should be noted that the English cases most fre­
quently cited in support of this proposition were decided during the first half of this 
century. See, e.g. , Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R. Crampton & Bros., Ltd., (1925] A.C. 445, 
alf'g, [1923) 2 K.B. 251; Appleson v. Littlewood, Ltd., (1939) 1 All E.R. 464; Jones v. 
Vernon's Pools, Ltd., ( 1938] 2 All E.R. 626. Similarly, English courts have not yet em­
braced the doctrine of promissory estoppel as enthusiastically as their American counter­
parts. See P. ATIVAH, R1sE AND FALL, supra note 12, at 775-78. 
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their practical applications by courts. Ultimately cases dealing 
with this freedom suggest that intent, in a form however modi­
fied or circumscribed, will continue for some time as the ground 
of our law of contract. 
